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BILLBOARD CONTROL UNDER THE IDGHWAY
"
BEAUTIFICATION
ACT OF 1965
Roger A. Cunningham*
I.
A.

THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Title I of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965

In a nation of continental size, transportation is essential to the
growth and prosperity of the national economy.
But that economy, and the roads that serve it, are not ends in
themselves. They are meant to serve the real needs of the people of
this country. And those needs include the opportunity to touch
nature and see beauty, as well as rising income and swifter travel.
Therefore, we must make sure that the massive resources we now
devote to roads also serve to improve and broaden the quality of
American life.1
HIS statement by President Johnson signified an important
change in federal-aid highway policy. As two leading commentators observed, "[i]t clearly implied that henceforth highways should
be viewed not only as facilities of transportation but as features of
the community and environment, and that environmental quality
ranked with engineering quality in roadbuilding." 2 To carry out the
new policy, the Johnson Administration, in May 1965, submitted a
bill to Congress requiring each state to establish, by January I, 1968,
controls over roadside advertising and junkyards along interstate and
primary federal-aid highways, on penalty of forfeiting all federal
highway funds to which the state would otherwise be entitled.3 In
addition, the Administration bill included provisions allocating to
each state, on a nonmatching basis, federal funds for "acquisition of
interests in and improvement of strips of land necessary for the restoration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to
such roads." 4 This bill, with congressional revisions, became the
Highway Beautification Act of 1965.5
While the Highway Beautification Act as a whole is designed to

T

• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. S.B., J.D., Harvard University.-Ed.
I. H.R. Doc. No. 191, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965) (letter of President Johnson).
2. R. NETHERTON &: M. MARKHAM, ROADSIDE DEV:c:LOPMENT AND BEAUTIFICATION: LEGAL
AUTHORITY AND METHODS pt. II, at 12 (Highway Research Board, 1966).
3. S. 2084, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Title I of the bill dealt with highway advertising; title II contained junkyard control provisions.
4. S. 2084, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. III, § 3 (1965).
5. Pub. L. No. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028 (codified at 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319 (1970)).
The Highway Beautification Act became effective on October 22, 1965.
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be a comprehensive program to promote the scenic enhancement of
highways, this Article will focus on title I,6 which deals with control
of outdoor advertising. Title II, which deals with junkyard control,
is similar to title I, but it has not given rise to the problems and
controversy produced by title I. Title III, which provides for landscaping and scenic enhancement of federal-aid highways, is quite
different from titles I and II.
The main thrust of title I is reasonably clear. Unless a state is
willing to accept a ten per cent reduction in its portion of federal
highway funds it must establish "effective control" of outdoor advertising along the interstate and primary federal-aid highways within its
boundaries.7 "Effective control" means that no signs visible from the
6. Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-285, tit. I, 79 Stat. 1028.
Section 101 of title I completely changed the substance of section 131 of title 23 of the
United States Code (originally codified by the Act of Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-767,
72 Stat. 904). Section 102 simply amended the table of section headings in 23 U.S.C. by
striking out the old section heading, "131. Areas adjacent to the Interstate System,'' and
inserting in lieu thereof, "131. Control of outdoor advertising." Although technically all
the lettered paragraphs of title I are subsections of section 101, for convenience they
will be referred to in this Article as subsections of title I, since section 102 of the Act
contains no substantive provisions.
7. Title I, subsection (a), 23 U.S.C. § 13l(a) (1970), states the congressional finding
and declaration that "the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs,
displays, and devices in areas adjacent to the Interstate System and the primary system
should be controlled in order to protect the public investment in such highways, to
promote the safety and recreational value of public travel, and to preserve natural
beauty."
Subsection (b) states that if a state has not, by January 1, 1968, provided for effective control of the erection and maintenance along the interstate and primary systems
of outdoor advertising signs within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way and
visible from the main traveled way, that state's annual apportionments of highway
construction funds under section 104 of title 23 of the United States Code shall be
reduced by ten per cent of the amount that would otherwise be apportioned, until the
state provides for such control. The ten per cent penalty applies to the state's portion
of funds, not only for the interstate and federal-aid primary systems, but also for the
federal-aid secondary system and the urban extensions of the primary and secondary
systems. Any amount withheld under subsection (b) is to be reapportioned to the other
states. The Secretary of Transportation is to determine whether a state has made provision for the effective control of outdoor advertising. Whenever he determines it to be
in the public interest, he may suspend, for such periods as he deems necessary, the application of the ten per cent penalty to a state.
It should be noted that the decision to use a penalty provision represented a major
change in federal-aid policy, since use of financial penalties was considered and rejected by Congress in 1958, see R. NETHERTON & M. MARKHAM, supra note 2, pt. II, at
48-49, in favor of encouraging state implementation of the national policy on roadside
advertising by increasing financial aid to states that enacted sign controls. This approach
was embodied in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, § 12, 72
Stat. 96, which provided for a bonus of one half of one per cent of the federal-aid
highway funds otherwise allocated to a particular state. For a discussion of the 1958
law and the national standards promulgated thereunder, see Enfield, Control of Outdoor
Advertising: Federal Law and Standards, in 1961 REPORT OF THE COMMIITEE ON ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT 54 (Highway Research Board); BLACK, NATIONAL POLICY AND STANDARDS RELATING TO CONTROL OF ROADSIDE Al>\'ERTISiNG ALONG THE INTERSTATE SYSIEM 3-6
(Highway Research Board Bulletin No. 337, 1962); R. NETHERTON & M. MARKHAM, supra,
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main travelled way shall be permitted within 660 feet of the highway right-of-way unless exempted by the Act. 8 The several broad exemptions that are created by the Act include all advertising signs in
zoned and unzoned commercial and industrial areas,9 as well as official
signs and signs advertising the sale or lease of the property on which
they are located or other activity "conducte'd. on the property in which
they are located." 10 In practice, this means that almost all existing
off-premises advertising signs in rural areas will be prohibited,11 since
few rural areas contain sections zoned or developed for commercial or
industrial use. In urban areas, most of the existing off-premises advertising signs are located in areas zoned for commercial or industrial use
and consequently will not be subject to removal under title I unless
they fail to conform to certain size, lighting, and spacing standards.12
New off-premises advertising signs may be established in commercial
and industrial areas so long as they conform to such standards, which
must be "consistent with customary use." 13
In areas zoned for commercial or industrial use what is "customary use" with respect to the size, lighting, and spacing of off-premises
advertising signs may be determined either by the local zoning authority or by agreement between the state and the Secretary of Transportation.14 The definition of an unzoned commercial or industrial
pt. II, at 48-50. The national standards, as promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce,
were published in 23 Fed. Reg. 8793 (1958), and may now be found, as amended, in 23
C.F.R. §§ 750.101-.110 (1973). Pertinent administrative directives were issued by the
Bureau of Public Roads. See U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, Dept. of Commerce, Policy
and Procedure Memorandum 21-4.S (January 22, 1963) (relating to acquisition of advertising rights); U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, Dept. of Commerce, Policy and Procedure
Memorandum 30-8 (January 22, 1963) (dealing with incentive payments for controlling
outdoor advertising on the interstate system).
The House Public Works Committee's decision to impose only a ten per cent penalty
instead of the one hundred per cent penalty proposed in the Administration bill (compare H.R. REP. No. 1084, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 HousE Rfil>oRT),
with S. 2084, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, § 1 (1965)), represents a significant modification
of the policy, since it substantially reduces the pressure for state compliance with title I.
8. Title I, subsection (d), 23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970). Since the lettered paragraphs of
title I correspond to those in 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1970), this Article will refer to the subsections of title I and section 131 interchangeably.
9. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970).
10. 23 U.S.C. § 131(c) (1970).
11. See Hearings on S. 561 and S. 1142 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Senate Hearings] _(exhibit submitted fo~ the record by ~e Roadside Business Association), indicating
that m rural areas approximately 839,000 signs (seventy-one per cent of the off-premise
signs in the United States) would have to be removed.
12. But see id., indi_cating that, by means of 1!1e. agr~ements entered into by the
former Bureau of Public Roads and the states, existing signs that are nonconforming
only because they violate size, lighting, or spacing regulations will be allowed to remain.
13. 23 U.S.C. § 131(d) (1970).
14. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970).
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area, as well as the standards for signs in these areas, is to be determined "by agreement between the several States and the Secretary."15
Off-premises advertising signs erected in areas not exempt under
title I are to be removed whether they were erected before or after
enactment of the Act and whether they were lawfully or unlawfully
erected. The states are to use their police power, to the extent constitutionally possible, to remove any signs that were unlawfully
erected either before or after the enactment. But, as a general rule,
"just compensation" is to be given upon removal of lawfully erected
off-premises signs.16
B.

Title I: Some Problems of Construction

Unfortunately, title I is not well drafted, in part because it represents an uneasy compromise between those members of Congress who
wanted little, if any, control of outdoor advertising along the highways and those members who wanted very stringent controls. For example, the provisions of subsection (d) allowing advertising signs
within 660 feet of the right-of-way in areas zoned or established
(though unzoned) as industrial or commercial areas were a response
15. 23 U.S.C. § 131(d) (1970).
16. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(g) (1970). In all cases, the federal share of compensation is to
be 75 per cent. But a new subsection (n), added by amendment in 1968, FederalAid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 6(d), 82 Stat. 817, provides that no
advertising sign shall be required to be removed if the federal share is not available.
The rest of title I can be summarized as follows: Subsection (e) provides that no sign
lawfully in existence along the interstate or primary systems on September 1, 1965,
which does not conform to the requirements of title I, shall be required to be removed
until July 1, 1970, and that no other lawfully erected sign shall be required to be removed until the end of the fifth year after it becomes nonconforming.
The Secretary is expressly authorized by subsection (j) to continue the bonus payments
provided for by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 to any state highway department
that, prior to July 1, 1965, entered into an agreement with the Secretary to control outdoor advertising signs in areas adjacent to the interstate system. Subsection (j) originally
provided for continuation of bonus payments provided "the State maintains the control
required under such agreement or the control required by this section, whichever control is stricter." A 1968 amendment eliminated the requirement that the state meet the
stricter of the two standards, thus assuring that bonus payments will be continued so
long as a state "maintains the control required under such agreement." Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 6(b), 82 Stat. 817. However, the final sentence in subsection (j) provides that nothing in that subsection shall be "construed to
exempt any State from controlling outdoor advertising as otherwise provided in" title I.
Thus, a state may continue to qualify for bonus payments of one half of one per cent
under the 1958 Act and at the same time be subject to the ten per cent penalty for
failure to comply with the requirements of title I of the 1965 Act.
Subsection (k) provides that nothing in title I shall prohibit a state from establishing
stricter standards than those established under that title.
Subsection (l) provides for judicial review in the United States district courts of any
final determination by the Secretary of Transportation to withhold funds from a state
under subsection (b) because of its failure to provide for effective control.
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to pressure from the billboard industry and the roadside business
associations. Pressure from these interests is also evident in the explanatory language that introduces subsection (d)-"In order to promote the reasonable, orderly and effective display of outdoor advertising while remaining consistent with the purpose of this section
. . ."-a phrase that may cause much difficulty because it can be
construed as stating a second congressional purpose for enactment of
title I, in addition to that stated in subsection (a).17 Moreover, the
Administration bill, as originally introduced in May 1965, merely
authorized the use of the states' police power to control roadside
advertising; but in response to pressure from the billboard and roadside business interests, the Senate Public "\-Vorks Committee inserted
the compensation provision now found in subsection (g).18
In part, however, the poor draftsmanship of title I is a result of
the lack of adequate consideration that characterized its passage by
Congress. One consequence of this was that the draftsmen frequently
used unclear or ambiguous language, thus leaving a number of difficult constructional problems, none of which has been authoritatively
resolved by the United States Supreme Court. I propose to deal here
with the following problems of construction: (1) What does "effective
control" of outdoor advertising under subsections (b) and (c) mean in
light of subsection (k)? (2) What is the meaning and effect of subsection (d)? (3) What is the meaning and effect of subsections (e) and (n)
in light of subsection (k)? (4 )What is the meaning and effect of the
provision in subsection (g) for payment of "just compensation" upon
removal of nonconforming outdoor advertising signs?
I. "Effective Control" of Outdoor Advertising Under
Subsections (b) and (c), in Light of Subsection (k).

Subsection (b), the operative provision of title I, requires the
states to provide for "effective control" of certain signs in order to
17. The provisions of subsection (d), as finally adopted, were hailed by the billboard
industry: "For the first time, it is an admission by a governmental body that outdoor
advertising can legitimately conduct business in commercial and industrial areas of
this country. And it will help to weed out the fly-by-night operators who have been
the bane of the industry." Editorial, Seize the };foment, PENNSYLVANIA OUIDOOR NEWS,
November 1965, at 2. Although subsection (d) is drawn in such broad terms as to include
all kinds of advertising signs, its principal impact is to permit "off-premises" signs-i.e.,
signs not within the classes exempted by subsection (c)-in zoned and unzoned commercial and industrial areas.
18. The explanation given for this change was that the Highway Beautification Act
would apply to the federal-aid primary system as well as to the interstate system and
that payment of compensation would be necessary to avoid disastrous economic effects
on the billboard industry and the small roadside businesses that had developed together
with the primary road system over a period of 40 to 50 years. 111 CONG, REc. 12797-98
(1965) (remarks of Sen. Cooper).
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avoid the ten per cent penalty. Subsection (c) defines "effective control" as described above. 19 But subsection (k.) provides that nothing
in title I "shall prohibit a state from establishing standards imposing
stricter limitations with respect to signs, displays, and devices on the
federal-aid highway systems than those established under" title I.
The legislative history indicates that this provision was "to make it
clear that there is no attempt by the federal government to pre-empt
the field to the extent that only federal regulation may be used to
control advertising along the highways." 20 It is not clear, however,
exactly what Congress meant by the use of the terms "standards" and
"limitations."
After a perusal of all the committee hearings, 21 committee reports,22 and floor debates23 that preceded enactment of the Highway
Beautification Act, I have concluded that subsection (k.) was designed
to allow the states to impose stricter limitations than those required
by subsections (b) and (c), by means of standards embodied in
state statutes or local ordinances enacted pursuant to state enabling
legislation. That is, subsection (k.) makes it clear that none of the
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are intended to give commercial
sign owners a federal right to maintain advertising signs either more
than 660 feet from the right-of-way or within the 660 foot strip.

2. Subsection ( d): The Commercial and Industrial
Area Exceptions
No part of title I has generated more controversy than subsection
(d), which permits outdoor advertising signs
whose size, lighting and spacing, consistent with customary use is to
be determined by agreement between the several States and the Secretary, ... within areas adjacent to the Interstate and primary systems
which are zoned industrial or commercial under authority of State
19. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
20. 1965 HousE REl'oRT, supra note 7, at 9. See also S. REP. No. 709, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 SENATE REPORT): "The committee emphasizes that where
State or local law imposes more stringent controls than S. 2084 over outdoor advertising
signs, displays, or devices-both on and off premise-the intent is that State or local
law shall prevail. It is not the intent of the committee that the provisions of this section
shall preempt or weaken State or local laws imposing more rigid requirements."
21. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2081 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate Comm.
on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 48, 72-73, 102-03, 107-10, 114, 391 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearings]; Hearings on H.R. 8187 Before the Subcomm. on Roads
of the House Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-70, 128-31, 247-50 (1965)
[hereinafter 1965 House Hearings].
22. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., 111 CoNG. R.Ec. 23878-79 (remarks of Sen. Fong), 26164 (letter from
Undersecretary of Commerce Boyd to Rep. Edmondson), 26263-65 (colloquy between
Reps. Meeds, Edmondson, and Adams), 26279 (remarks of Rep. McVicker) (1965).
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law, or in unzoned commercial or industrial areas as may be determined by agreement between the several States and the Secretary,
and which further provides that the states
shall have full authority under their own zoning laws to zone areas
for commercial or industrial purposes, and the actions of the States
in this regard will be accepted for the purposes of this Act. 24
The language of subsection (d) is permissive rather than mandatory. Therefore, even without subsection (k.), I would conclude that
a state statute or local ordinance dealing with control of outdoor
advertising need not include the blanket exemption for off-premises
signs in commercial and industrial areas that is permitted by subsection (d).
Unfortunately, subsection (d) presents more difficult interpretative problems: What is "customary use"? How is "agreement between
the several States and the Secretary" to be effected? Is the authority of the states to zone areas for commercial and industrial use
absolute for title I purposes?
On January 10, 1967, after holding fifty-two public hearings
throughout the United States, the former Bureau of Public Roads
presented to Congress a set of "proposed standards and criteria for
size, lighting and spacing of signs permitted in commercial or industrial zones and areas," including a proposed definition of an "unzoned
commercial or industrial area" for outdoor advertising control purposes.25 These proposed standards and criteria were expressly stated
to be merely "a basis on which to establish agreements between the
several States and the Secretary."26 But they were met with massive
objections and criticism from the advertising industry during the
1967 hearings of the Subcommittee on Roads of the House Public
Works Committee,27 principally on the grounds that they were too
restrictive and that the Bureau was seeking to force the states to
accept them instead of trying to work out standards and criteria
through a true process of negotiations. The attitude of the House
Subcommittee during the hearings was markedly hostile toward the
whole highway beautification program in general and title I in particular. As a consequence of this pressure, Secretary Boyd on May 24,
24. 23 U.S.C. § 131(d) .(1970).
25. S. Doc. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-49 (1967).
26. Id. at 45.
27. Hearings on H.R. 7797 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the House Comm. on
Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 House Hearings] (opening
statement of Chairman Kluczynski).
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1967, shortly after the conclusion of the Subcommittee hearings, sent
a letter to Chairman Kluczynski in which he made the following
concessions on behalf of the Department of Transportation in regard
to zoned areas:
I. As the law directs, we are fully prepared to accept state determinations with respect to zoned commercial and industrial areas.
2. Concerning unzoned commercial and industrial areas, we shall
be happy to request the guidance and suggestions of the several States
with respect to designating these areas. The only absolute requirement upon which we would insist would be the existence of at least
one commercial activity in any such area. Surely this could not be
considered unreasonable.
3. With regard to the determination of what constitutes "customary use" in the zoned commercial and industrial areas, we shall be
glad to look to the states for certification that either the state authority or a bona fide local zoning authority has made such a determination. With respect to unzoned areas, we will recognize local
practice on customary use as mutually agreed to by State and Federal
agencies. It ·will be our policy to assume the good faith of the several
states in this regard.
The only exception to the above would be a situation in which a
State or local authority might attempt to circumvent the law by zoning an area as "commercial" for billboard purposes only. We think
you will agree that this is a reasonable position, since we know that
the Congress does not wish for the law to be deliberately evaded by
subterfuge.
4. What is determined in good faith by a bona fide local or state
zoning authority as "customary use" will be an acceptable basis for
standards as to size, spacing, and lighting in the commercial and
industrial areas within the geographical jurisdiction of that state or
local authority.2s

The concessions in Secretary Boyd's letter marked a substantial
retreat from the positions previously taken by the Bureau of Public
Roads, but opponents of title I (both in and out of Congress) were not
satisfied. The House version of the 1968 Federal-Aid Highway Act29
would virtually have killed title I by eliminating the ten per cent
penalty provided by subsection (b) and making the control of outdoor
advertising entirely voluntary on the part of the states.30 In addition,
the House version would have vested in the states or their political
28. Letter from Alan S. Boyd, Secretary of Transportation, to Rep. John Kluczynski,
May 24, 1967, in Hearings on S. 1467 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings].
29. H.R. 17134, passed by the House, July 3, 1968, in 114 CONG. R.Ec. 19945 (1968).
30. H.R. 17134, § 6(a), passed by the House, July 3, 1968, in 114 CONG. R.Ec. 19945
(1968).
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subdivisions the power to define "unzoned commercial and industrial
areas" and to determine "customary use" with respect to the size,
lighting, and spacing of advertising signs in both zoned and unzoned
commercial and industrial areas.31 However, the bill that emerged
from the Conference Committee and was finally enacted32 left subsection (b) of title I without change and amended subsection (d) only
by adding the following provision: "Whenever a bona fide State,
county or local zoning authority has made a determination of customary use, such determination will be accepted in lieu of controls by
agreement in the zoned commercial and industrial areas within the
geographical jurisdiction of such authority." 33
As subsection (d) now stands, regulation of off-premises advertising in areas zoned for commercial or industrial use would seem to
be entirely within the discretion of the state or local zoning agency
that has jurisdiction over the area. Presumably, the state or local
agency may either include regulations with respect to the size, lighting, and spacing of advertising signs within its general regulations
dealing with commercial and industrial districts, or adopt a special
set of regulations defining "customary use." The only possible limitation on state or local zoning agency powers would seem to be the
exception noted in Secretary Boyd's letter of May 24, 1967: that the
Department would not allow "a State or local authority [to] attempt
to circumvent the law by zoning an area as 'commercial' for billboard
purposes only." 34
However, it is not clear whether the Department of Transportation may ignore such state or local action. The original subsection
(d) grant of authority to the states "to zone areas for commercial or
industrial purposes" concludes with an express stipulation that "the
actions of the States in this regard will be accepted for the purposes
of this Act." And the sentence, added by the 1968 amendment, that
authorizes state or local zoning authorities to determine "customary
use" contains no limitation on their discretion.35 But the first sentence
of subsection (d), which contains the basic grant of permission for
off-premises advertising signs in commercial and industrial areas, does
31. H.R. 17134, § 6(c), passed by the House, July 3, 1968, in 114 CoNG. REC. 19945
(1968).
32. The conference bill appears in 114 CONG. REC. 23692 (1968). As enacted, it was
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, 82 Stat. 815 (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
33. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 6(a), 82 Stat. 817 (codified
at 23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970)).
34. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
35. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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impose a significant limitation by means of the phrase "consistent
with the purposes of this section." The congressional purposes are
generally set forth in subsection (a), which states that outdoor advertising signs in areas adjacent to the interstate and primary systems
"should be controlled in order to protect the public investment in
such highways, to promote the safety and recreational value of public
travel, and to preserve natural beauty." Thus, it can be argued that
state or local action that zones an area as "commercial" or "industrial"
solely or primarily to allow location of off-premises advertising signs
within 660 feet of an interstate or primary federal-aid highway is not
consistent with the purposes stated in subsection (a), and that the
Department of Transportation therefore need not accept such action
as complying with the "effective control" requirement laid down in
subsection (b). Presumably Secretary Boyd had this in mind when he
said, in his letter of May 24, 1967, "we know that the Congress does
not wish for the law to be deliberately evaded by subterfuge." 36 The
current guidelines issued by the Federal Highway Administration
substantially reiterate the minimum standard laid down in Secretary
Boyd's letter.37 The Administration's position was recently upheld
in a significant United States district court case sustaining the Secretary's determination to withhold ten per cent of the federal-aid
highway funds that would otherwise have been allocated to South
Dakota for the fiscal year 1973.38
36. See text accompanying note 28 supra. See also the remarks of Sen. Randolph
during the debates on the Highway Beautification Act of 1965: "When state or local
governments act to zone areas for commercial or industrial purposes, in accordance with
the state's traditional exercise of authority on zoning, these determinations will be
accepted for purposes of billboard or junkyard control. This language, of course, does
not mean that a state or local authority could place a label 'zoned commercial or industrial' on land adjacent to the Interstate and primary systems solely to permit billboards or junkyards and thereby frustrate the intent of Congress stated in section 13l(a)."
89 CoNc. REc. 26820 (1965).
37. 23 C.F.R. § 750.305(c) (1973).
38. South Dakota v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 335 (D.S.D. 1973). The South Dakota case
holds that the South Dakota statute, S.D. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 31-29-1 to -60 (1970), is
not in compliance with title I on several grounds. The case is discussed in note 131 infra
and accompanying text.
Since the original Wyoming "compliance" law, ch. 242, [1967] Wyo. Laws 697, zoned
all agricultural lands outside of municipalities and lying within 660 feet of the edge
of any interstate or primary highway as "commercial," subject to rezoning by the several boards of county commissioners, it is not surprising that the Federal Highway
Administration did not consider it to be consistent with title I requirements. If the
Federal Highway Administrator had formally determined to impose the ten per cent
penalty provided by subsection (b) on Wyoming, Wyoming could have invoked the
judicial review provisions of subsection (l). But the Administrator never made the necessary decision to withhold funds and the issue was not judicially reviewed prior to the
repeal of the law by ch. 250, § 16, [1971] Wyo. Laws 568. The current "compliance"
law is found in WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-110 to -124 (1971).
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There was, initially, also a bitter controversy over the definition of
"unzoned commercial and industrial areas." Subsection (d) states
that such definition is to be made "by agreement between the several
States and the Secretary." The proposed standards and criteria for
resolving this question that were transmitted to Congress by the
Bureau of Public Roads on January IO, 1967,89 were, in effect, abandoned when Secretary Boyd sent his letter of May 24, 1967, to Chairman K.luczynski of the House Subcommittee on Roads.40 That letter
said in part: "Concerning unzoned commercial and industrial areas,
we shall be happy to request the guidance and suggestions of the
several States with respect to designating these areas. The only
absolute requirement upon which we would insist would be the
existence of at least one commercial activity in any such area." As
far as can be ascertained, this is still the position of the Federal
Highway Administration,41 and, although many of the state laws in
their original form did not comply with even this requirement,42 it
now appears that all but one of the fifty states have statutes that do
comply with it.48
39. S. Doc. No. 6, supra note 25, at 46-47.
40. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
41. U.S. Federal Highway Administration, Dept. of Transportation, Policy and Pro•
cedure Memorandum 80-5.2, 11 5(d) (Dec. 12, 1972) [hereinafter Policy and Procedure
Memorandum 80-5.2), simply states: "[a]ctual industrial or commercial use at any given
time will determine the classification of unzoned commercial or industrial areas."
42. See R. CUNNINGHAM, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ADVERTISING SIGNS: SOME LEGAL PROB•
LEMS 26-27 (Highway Research Board, NCHRP Report No. 119, 1971).
43. See text accompanying notes 129-31 infra, Opposition to the "absolute require•
ment" that any area to be defined as an "unzoned commercial or industrial area" must
have "at least one commercial [or industrial) activity" already in existence in the area
has been based primarily on tw·o separate but closely related arguments. First, it is
argued that such a requirement would eliminate about 90 per cent of the existing
off-premises advertising sigus in rural areas, and that Congress could not have intended
such a drastic result in view of the introductory clause of subsection (d). Second, it is
argued that such a drastic elimination of off-premises advertising signs in rural areas is
not essential to the achievement of the stated scenic purpose of title I ("to preserve
natural beauty"), since many rural areas that presently have no commercial or industrial
uses are not naturally beautiful. Hence, it is argued, it would be more consistent with
congressional intent for the Secretary of Transportation to accept proposals from the
states for defining as "unzoned commercial and industrial areas" certain rural areas that
are not naturally beautiful and that would be appropriate for commercial or industrial
uses although no such uses are presently in existence. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra
note 28, at 102-31; 1967 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 213-29 (statement of R.D.
Hetrick, President, Roadside Business Association); Hearings on S. 3118 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 2 Sess. 322-30,
342-45 (1968); Hearings on H.R. 17134 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the House
Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 593-98, 610-13 (1968) (statement of Donald
S. Barbour, member of the Executive Committee, Roadside Business Association); 1969
Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 61-67, 71-89; Hearings on Highway Legislation Before
the Subcomm. on Roads of the House Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
146-61 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 House Hearings] (statement of Paul Spooner, General
Counsel, Roadside Business Association).
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Subsections (e) and (n): Time for Removal of
"Nonconforminrf' Signs

Subsection (e) of title I states flatly that
[a]ny sign, display, or device lawfully in existence along the Interstate System or the Federal-aid primary system on September I, 1965,
which does not conform to this section shall not be required to be
removed until July I, 1970. Any other sign, display, or device law£ully erected which does not conform to this section shall not be
required to be removed until the end of the fifth year after it becomes nonconforming.
The House report explains that the purpose of this subsection
"is to allow the advertising business to amortize, in so far as possible,
its existing investment in the signboards before they are removed.'' 44
The Report also states that the subsection provides a "!5-year period
before existing signs [made nonconforming by title I] actually will
have to come down," 45 and that the last sentence is designed to cover
lawfully existing signs that become nonconforming in the future as
a result of (I) incorporation of a part of the secondary highway system
into the primary system and (2) later revision of regulations issued
at the outset of the advertising control program.46
The reference in the House report to the five-year grace period as
designed to allow amortization is puzzling. In zoning law the concept
of "amortization" has generally been used to allow the owner of a
nonconforming building or of the situs of any nonconforming use to
continue the nonconformance for a designated period of time before
being compelled to discontinue it, without compensation, by an
application of the police power.47 Since subsection (g) of title I proBy the time of the 1969 hearings of the Senate and House Subcommittees on Roads,
the Roadside Business Association, representing the major commercial interests opposed
to the Secretary's "absolute requirement" of "at least one commercial activity" as a basis
for defining "unzoned commercial and industrial areas," was advocating a major revision
of title I, under which off-premises advertising signs would be excluded only from scenic
areas, areas zoned for residential use, or other locations designated by state statute or
local ordinance. The principal effect of such a revision, of course, would be to open up
all nonscenic rural areas to off-premises advertising. It is conceivable that the Commission on Highway Beautification, see text accompanying notes 317-24 infra, may recommend a shift to this approach, but it seems unlikely in view of the federal highway
authorities' recent success in overcoming the resistence of many states to the restrictive
definition of "unzoned commercial and industrial areas" championed by the former
Bureau of Public Roads and the present Federal Highway Administration.
44. 1965 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 5-6.
47. For a good judicial discussion of the "amortization" concept in connection with
nonconforming uses under zoning ordinances, see Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d
553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
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vides for the payment of just compensation when nonconforming
signs are removed, it is hard to see the relevance of the amortization
concept. It is possible that the House committee had in mind the fact
that most advertising "leases" initially run for five years. But since
the value of all periods for which the "lessee" has the option to renew
must be included in valuing the "leasehold," it is still difficult to
see the relevance of the five-year period. It is also possible that the
House committee thought that advertising sign owners, when faced
with a requirement that all nonconforming signs should ultimately
be removed, might allow their nonconforming signs to deteriorate
during the five-year minimum period allowed under subsection (e),
thus reducing the amount of compensation that would ultimately
have to be paid.48 But it is hard to see why a sign owner would find it
advantageous to allow its signs to deteriorate during the grace period,
since in any case it would be assured of just compensation based on
their value at the date of removal. And, for reasons which will be
stated in the next section of this Article,49 it does not seem that the
Committee intended that partial, or even full, amortization of the
sign owners' interests might be accomplished so that full payment
would become unnecessary. It seems probable, therefore, that the
five-year grace period was provided to allow the states a reasonable
time in which to adopt compliance laws, make inventories of conforming and nonconforming signs, enact desired zoning regulations
for industrial and commercial areas, negotiate necessary agreements
with the federal authorities, set up plans for the orderly removal of
nonconforming signs, and actually carry out the removal. The adoption in 1968 of subsection (n), which provides that no removal shall
be required under title I until the federal compensation funds are
available, 50 further extended the time, since substantial federal funding of the removal program was delayed until fiscal 1970.51 The
Federal Highway Administration now estimates that, at the 1973
48. For a discussion favoring this theory, see Lamm &: Yasinow, The Highway Beautification Act of 1965: A Case Study in Legislative Frustration, 46 DENVER L.J. 437, 444-45
(1969).
49. See text accompanying notes 53-114 infra.
50. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 6(d), 82 Stat. 817 (codified
at 23 U.S.C. § 13l(n) (1970)).
51. See 23 U.S.C. § 13l(m) (1970), which now provides:
There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of this section,
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, not to exceed
$20,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, not to exceed S20,000,000 for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967, not to exceed $20,000,000 for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1970, not to exceed $27,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1971, not to exceed $20,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and not to
exceed $50,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973.
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fiscal year funding level, the sign removal program, nationwide, will
take five to six years. 52
Although it may be largely academic in view of the understandable reluctance of most states to proceed with compensated removal
of nonconforming signs before funding of the seventy-five per cent
federal share, it seems clear that the states remain free, under subsection (k) of title I, to require removal of nonconforming signs
within a shorter period than is required by subsections (e) and (n).
Neither subsection (e) nor subsection (n) was intended to give sign
owners a federal right to maintain nonconforming signs for the
maximum period allowable under these provisions if a state wishes
to require earlier removal and can satisfy the just compensation requirements of subsection (g). Both subsection (e) and subsection (n)
were merely intended to make it clear that no state need require removal of nonconforming signs prior to the times specified therein in
order to avoid the ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b).

4. Subsection (g): "Just Compensation" upon Removal
of Advertising Signs
It seems reasonably clear that a state must provide for the payment of just compensation upon the removal of outdoor advertising
signs if it is to avoid the ten per cent penalty, although this point will
not be conclusively established until it has been determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States. The point was sufficiently troublesome that, in 1966, the Secretary of Commerce sought an opinion
from the U.S. Attorney General on (a) whether title I may be read
as granting to the states the option of using their police power to
52. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-5.2, supra note 41, ,r IO(c), which also
recommends the following order of priority in removal:
(I) Illegal and abandoned signs.
(2) Hardship situations.
(3) Minimum value signs.
(4) Signs in areas which have been designated as scenic under authority of State law.
(5) Product advertising on:
(a) Rural interstate highway.
(b) On rural primary highway.
(c) Urban areas.
(6) Nontourist-oricnted directional advertising.
(7) Tourist-oriented directional advertising.
These arc only recommended priorities; selection and programming of sign removal
projects is the responsibility of the states. 23 C.F.R. § 750.310(c) (1973). The general provision authorizing removal projects is 23 C.F.R. § 750.310(a) (1973):
A sign removal project may consist of any group of proposed sign removals selected
in a reasonable fashion. The signs may be those belonging to one company of those
located along a single route, all of the signs in a single county or other locality, or
any other similar grouping. Generally speaking, a single project should not include
signs along both Interstate and Primary highways unless the number of signs along
one system is so small that it would be more logical to include these in the project
than on the other system.
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remove outdoor advertising signs, without payment of compensation,
and without incurring the ten per cent penalty; and (b) whether, if
title I is construed as foreclosing such an option, the Congressional
requirement that just compensation be paid upon removal of outdoor
advertising signs is invalid as applied to a state where the removal
can constitutionally be effected under the police power.
Ramsey Clark, then Acting Attorney General, in an opinion issued November 16, 1966,53 concluded (a) that title I must be read as
requiring each state to afford just compensation upon removal of outdoor advertising signs as a condition of avoiding the ten per cent
penalty and (b) that there is no basis for concluding that this requirement is unconstitutional as to any state.
Clark's opinion points out, with respect to the first question, that
title I does not by express language either require or forbid the application of the ten per cent penalty in the event of an election by a state
to rely upon its police power in removing outdoor advertising signs.
But the intent of Congress that the penalty should be applied if the
state so elects is reasonably inferrable from the language of the Act
and the legislative history of title I.54 Subsection (c) defines "effective
control" to mean that, after January l, 1968, advertising signs "shall,
pursuant to this section, be limited to" 55 specified types. The italicized words may reasonably be interpreted to require that, where the
control of signs requires removals, the standard of effective control
has not been met unless just compensation has been paid in accordance with subsection (g). Moreover, title IV of the Highway Beautification Act includes section 401, which, although it is poorly drafted,
clearly indicates the intent of the Congress to assure, so far as possible,
that just compensation should be paid whenever lawfully existing
advertising signs are "taken" or an existing and reasonable use of land
for advertising purposes is "restricted." 56
Even if the language referred to in the preceding paragraphs is
not deemed sufficiently clear to establish the congressional intent to
require compensation, the legislative history of the Highway Beautification Act removes all reasonable doubt. The Administration-sponsored bill, B. 2084, which originated title I, did not require compensation. It originally contained the following subsection:
53. 42 OP. ATIY. GEN. No. 26 (1966).
54. Id. at 2-5.
55. 23 U.S.C. § 131(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
56. See Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-285, tit. IV, § 401, 79
Stat. 1033: "Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed
to authorize private property to be taken or the reasonable and existing use restricted
by such taking without just compensation as provided in this Act."
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(g) Whenever a State shall submit evidence satisfactory to the
Secretary that it is unable to secure effective control, as herein provided, under its police powers, Federal-aid funds may be used to pay
the Federal pro rata share of the costs of providing effective control
by purchase or condemnation.57
It is apparent from the hearings that this provision was quite unsatisfactory to the members of both the House and the Senate committees. 58 The Senate Committee on Public Works rewrote it to include
a flat provision for the payment of just compensation upon removal
of outdoor advertising signs and explained that action as follows:
This section, as originally proposed, would have required the
States, wherever the authority exists, to exercise their police power
in acquiring advertising rights. The committee emphatically and
unanimously rejects the use of police power in acquiring these rights,
and has provided for the use of Federal funds for paying the Federal
pro rata share of the acquisition costs of such rights through purchase
or condemnation. Such payment is mandatory, not permissive, on
the States.5 9
Similar remarks appear in the report of the House Committee on
Public Works. 00 It is thus clear that the revision of the bill to provide
for payment of just compensation to those who suffered loss as a result of removal of outdoor advertising signs was intended by the Senate and House committees to leave no room for a penalty-free election
by any state to rely upon its police power and avoid payment of compensation.
It is also clear from the floor debates that the "mandatory" character of the just compensation provision was understood by the members of Congress. For example, in response to a question as to what
would happen if a state decided not to pay its twenty-five per cent
share of the just compensation, Senator Randolph, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Public Works and floor manager of S. 2084,
stated that ten per cent of the state's federal-aid highway funds would
be withheld until the state complied.61 And section 401 was added to
57. S. 2084, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. I, § IOI(g) (1965).
58. See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 43, 69-72, 98, 226, 278-81,
286-87; 1965 House Hearings, supra note 21, at 22-24, 39-41, 43-51, 107-08, 207-08, 250-52,
391.
59. 1965 SENA.TE REPORT, supra note 20, at 7.
60. 1965 HouSE REPoRT, supra note 7, at 71.
61. lll CoNG, R.Ec. 23874 (1965). See also discussion of "compensation" in lll CONG.
R.Ec. 23869 (Sen. Randolph), 23872 (Sen. Cooper and Sen. Muskie), 23875 (Sen. Randolph),
23880 (Sen. Randolph), 23883 (Sen. Cooper and Sen. Randolph), 23887-88 (Sen. Fong),
24126 (Sen. Dirksen and Sen. Randolph), 23134 (Sen. Allott), 26259 (Rep. Karth: "[i]f the
States do not pay the 25 percent they will be subject to a loss of money'), 26261 (Rep.
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the Highway Beautification Act on the floor of the Senate at the insistence of the late Senator Dirksen for the express purpose of making it
absolutely clear that it was the congressional policy to encourage the
payment of compensation rather than to authorize the states to rely
on their police power to implement titles I and II.62
Even if the only clues to congressional intent in enacting subsection (g) of title I were the subcommittee hearings, the Committee reports, and the floor debates with regard to the original Act, I would
conclude that the Attorney General's opinion is correct in stating that
"in order to receive a full allocation of highway funds, a State must
provide compensation in accordance with section 13l(g) even though
it is in a position to accomplish the required removals of billboards
by other means." 63 But title I has been the subject of subcommittee
consideration every year from 1967 through 1969, and there were extensive floor debates in both the Senate and House before enactment
of the 1968 amendments to title I. Without exception, these hearings
and floor debates reinforce the conclusion that Congress intended to
require the payment of compensation upon removal of advertising
signs as a condition of avoiding the ten per cent penalty.64
In light of the legislative history and subsequent congressional
treatment of the just compensation requirement of subsection (g), I
find quite unpersuasive the argument of Lamm and Yasinow that
Congress did not really intend by that subsection to require full compensation for the value of sign owners' and landowners' interests
when nonconforming signs were removed, but rather "thought that
partial or even full amortization of both sign owner and property
Kluczynski), 26262 (Rep. Edmondson), 26272 (Rep. Wright), 26274 (Rep. Blatnik), 2628182 (Rep. Pelly), 26318 (colloquy on "compensation") (1965).
62. For the text of section 401, see note 56 supra. When Senator Dirksen originally
proposed the amendment that became section 401, he said: "[T]his is a restatement of
the principles laid down in article V of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution." In response, Senator Randolph said, "I believe that the just compensation features of the
Senate bill 2084 are clear and conclusive on this point; but it is a restatement, and I
agree, and join the Senator from Illinois in accepting the amendment." Ill CONG. R.Ec.
24126 (1965). Before final passage, the amendment as offered by Senator Dirksen was
slightly altered by a substitute proposed by Senator Randolph. Ill CONG. R.Ec. 24189
(1965).
63. 42 OP. ATIY. GEN. No. 26, at 4-5 (1965).
64. See, e.g., 1969 House Hearings, supra note 43, at 155. Paul Spooner, General
Counsel, Roadside Business Association, stated he had been informed that the Federal
Highway Administration had informed at least one State "that the just compensation
provisions of the Federal act are not really binding and that there are ways to evade it."
In response, Rep. Cramer said, "We very clearly stated ••• that when signs are removed
there is to be just compensation. I do not think there is any doubt in the mind of any
member of this committee that that was the intention and purpose and the only fair
way to require the removal of signs."
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owner interests could be accomplished during [the 5-year grace period
allowed under subsection (e)], thus making 'compensation' as described in the act partially or totally unnecessary." 65 It may well be, as
Lamm and Yasinow assert, that "[m]any people .... assumed that
the use of the state police power to impose billboard control restrictions, which were the same or greater than those imposed by the federal statute, would continue to be available and would not impose an
obligation to 'justly compensate' upon either Federal or state Government," and that "[£]or these people the opinion of the Attorney General declaring that a state risked losing its Federal-Aid Highway funds
if it did not provide 'just compensation' came as no small shock.'' 66
But this assumption, and the shock that ensued when the Attorney
General's opinion was issued, were primarily due to a failure to read
carefully the legislative history of title I, subsection (g) of the 1965
Act. That the state highway agencies have generally accepted the Attorney General's opinion on this point is evidenced by the fact that
no state has challenged his interpretation, either in an action under
subsection ('l) contesting a determination to withhold funds or in a
declaratory judgment action under the judical review provisions of
the federal Administrative Procedure Act67 to determine whether it
conflicts with the tenth amendment.
It should be emphasized that Congress, in including the just compensation requirement in title I, intended to do more than simply
affirm state and federal constitutional guarantees of just compensation when private property is taken for public use. 68 If that were all
that subsection (g) was intended to do, any state that can constitutionally use its police power to effect the removal of highway advertising signs would be free of the federal compensation requirement,
because in such a case there would be no "taking" of private property
in the constitutional sense. But Congress intended virtually to rule
out use of state police power and to require the states, when highway
65. Lamm & Yasinow, supra note 48, at 444.
66. Id. at 443.
67. 5 u.s.c. §§ 701-06 (1970).
68. Section 401 of the Highway Beautification Act, set out in note 56 supra, is not
very helpful, but on the whole I believe it supports the position stated in the text. It is
clear that section 401 was added during consideration of the Act on the floor of the
Senate simply to satisfy the late Senator Dirksen. I do not believe much weight should
be given to Senator Dirksen's statement that "this is a restatement of the principles laid
down in article V of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution." 111 CONG. R.Ec. 24126
(1965). See note 62 supra. Certainly it does not indicate that Senator Dirksen favored the
use of the police power in any state where state and federal constitutions permit the
removal of nonconforming signs without compensation. Indeed, it is likely that Senator
Dirksen interpreted the due process clause of the United States Constitution to require
payment of compensation upon removal of any lawfully erected nonconforming sign.
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advertising signs are removed, either to pay the sign owners and landowners affected by the removal just compensation determined by mutual agreement or to utilize their power of eminent domain. I£ a
state uses its power of eminent domain, "just compensation" must, of
course, be determined by the state courts in accordance with their
usual rules in eminent domain cases.
The legislative history of title I includes many instances in which
proponents of the legislation stated that subsection (g) makes the payment of just compensation upon removal of highway advertising signs
"mandatory." 69 Consequently, it is necessary to determine whether
subsection (g) was intended to create an absolute federal right to compensation on the part of the affected sign owners and landowners,
even if a state might prefer to use its police power to bring about removal of highway advertising signs and run the risk of incurring the
ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b).
This issue was in fact raised and decided in Markham Advertising
Co. v. State, 70 although in a strict sense what the court said with respect to it was only a dictum. In the Markham case a large group of
outdoor advertising companies challenged the constitutionality of the
Washington Highway Advertising Control Act of 1961 71 on various
grounds. The Washington statute provided for the regulation of outdoor advertising in line with the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958.72
The Washington statute, inter alia, prohibited all off-premises advertising signs within designated scenic areas, and in certain other areas
permitted off-premises advertising signs only within twelve miles of
the activity advertised. 73 The statute specifically declared it unlawful
to maintain after March 11, 1964, or, in areas zoned for commercial
or industrial use, after March 11, 1965, any signs erected prior to
69. See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra. See also S. REP. No. 542, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1967) (the Senate Committee "reaffirmed its belief that mandatory compensation was necessary as a matter of simple justice"); H.R. REP. No. 713, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1967):
The committee believes that a clear statement of Congressional intent, as expressed
in the law, is called for.
Section 13l(g) and section 136G) ••• clearly and unequivocally require that just
compensation shall be paid ••••
Other alternative methods of handling the compensation requirement ••• were
considered and rejected •••• The language of the law is explicit, and it is not really
susceptible of misinterpretation. "Just compensation shall be paid • • •" is what the
law says, and that is what it means.
70. 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
71. Ch. 96, [1961) Wash. Laws 1575, WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 47.42.010-.910 (1961), as
amended, WASH, REv. CODE ANN.§ 47.42.020-.911 (Supp. 1972).
72. Pub. L. No. 85-381, 72 Stat. 89.
73. WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN.§ 47.42.040 (Supp. 1972).
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March II, 1961, that did not comply with the statute and regulations
issued thereunder. 74
All the nonconforming signs owned by the plaintiffs and involved
in the Markham case were lawfully erected prior to March II, 1961,75
and became unlawful, at the latest, on March II, 1965.76 Thus, the
just compensation requirement of subsection (g) of title I of the Highway Beautification Act was inapplicable, since the signs in question
were not "lawfully in existence" on October 22, 1965, the date of the
enactment of that Act. Notwithstanding this obvious fact, 77 however,
the plaintiffs in the ]Markham case argued that the just compensation
requirement under subsection (g) is absolutely mandatory-that Congress intended thereby "to displace contrary or inconsistent provisions
in the laws of this state [Washington], and in that respect has preempted, under the supremacy clause of the federal constitution, this
field of legislation"-and hence that the signs in question could not
be removed under the Washington statute without payment of just
compensation therefor. 78 Both the trial court and the Supreme Court
of Washington dealt with this argument on the merits, apparently
overlooking the fact that, even if the argument were accepted, subsection (g) had no application to the signs of the plaintiffs.
The trial court rejected the argument that Congress had preempted the field by imposing an absolutely mandatory requirement
of just compensation upon removal of advertising signs: "In passing
the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 ... Congress did not intend
to pre-empt the subject of highway advertising control. Rather, Congress intended to encourage the states to control highway advertising
74. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 47.42.100(1) (Supp. 1972). The original act required removal of all signs by March II, 1964, ch. 96, § 10(1), [1961] Wash. Laws 1579, but a 1963
amendment extended the grace period to March II, 1965, for nonconforming signs located in areas zoned for commercial or industrial use within any city or town. Ch. 3,
§ 55(l), [1963] Wash. Laws Extraordinary Sess. 1323.
75. 73 Wash. 2d at 414, 439 P .2d at 254.
76. WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 47.42.080 (Supp. 1972) expressly declares that "[a]ny
sign erected or maintained contrary to the provisions of this chapter or regulations
promulgated hereunder ••• shall be a public nuisance" subject to removal on fifteen
days' notice to the "permittee" or the owner of the land on which the sign is located.
77. This point was completely missed by counsel for the advertising companies, who
asserted in their brief that "virtually all of appellants' signs involved in this case were
'lawfully in e.xistence' on October 22, 1965, by virtue of permits from the State Highway
Commission." Brief for Appellants at 22-23. In fact, the Highway Commission had ordered appellants to remove their nonconforming signs because their "amortization"
periods of either three or four years had all expired. If the use of the police power to
require removal was othenvise valid, it is clear that none of the signs involved in the
suit were "lawfully in existence" on October 22, 1965.
78. Brief for Appellants at 22-25; Appellants' Petition for Rehearing at 2-8, apps.
A, B &: C.
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by making it financially advantageous for a state to do so." 79 When
the plaintiffs urged the same argument on appeal, the Washington
Supreme Court also rejected it.80 In a petition for rehearing before
the supreme court, the appellants repeated the argument.81 The
petition was denied. 82
The plantiffs' appeal to the United States Supreme Court was
dismissed per curiam "for want of a substantial federal question"; 83
a subsequent petition for rehearing was also denied. 84 Unfortunately,
a per curiam dismissal of an appeal "for want of a substantial federal
question" is not the equivalent of a decision upholding a challenged
state statute on the merits. But even though the issue has not yet been
conclusively decided, it is reasonably clear that the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of subsection (g) of title I of the Highway Beautification Act is correct.
Subsection (g) must, of course, be read in context, as part of the
Highway Beautification Act as a whole, and as part of chapter I of
title 23 of the United States Code. All of the provisions of chapter I
of title 23 define the position of the federal government as passive, except that it is to supply, and to specify conditions for the use of, funds
for the states to use for highway purposes. Under this chapter the federal government builds no highways; that has historically been a responsibility of the states. All the provisions of chapter I of title 23, including section 131 as a whole (title I of the Highway Beautification
Act) and subsection (g) thereof, are a part of that web of specifications
and conditions; the only inducement for the states to comply is the
grant of federal funds. The Highway Beautification Act, clearly based
on the same premise as the earlier provisions of chapter I, title 23 of
the United States Code, utilizes both the whip and the carrot to induce the states to build and maintain interstate and primary highways in accordance with certain federal conditions. Both title I and
title II (dealing with control of highway junkyards) of the Highway
Beautification Act use the whip-a ten per cent penalty-while title
III (dealing with landscaping and scenic enhancement) uses the carrot-a three per cent bonus. To single out subsection (g) of title I
and argue that it proceeds on an entirely different premise is absurd.
79. 73 Wash. 2d at 417,439 P.2d at 256. Accord, Southeastern Displays, Inc. v. Ward,
414 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1967).
80. 73 Wash. 2d at 419,439 P.2d at 257.
81. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing at 2-8, apps. A, B, &: C.
82. 73 Wash. 2d at 433, 439 P.2d at 257.
83. 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
84. 393 U.S. 1112 (1969).
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Title I of the Highway Beautification Act deals with only one aspect of the federal program of grants-in-aid for highway construction
and merely imposes certain conditions as a prerequisite to a state's receiving its full allocation of federal funds. There is no suggestion anywhere in the language of title I that Congress intended to impose any
absolute, mandatory requirements with respect to highway beautification by virtue of its power to regulate interstate commerce. The use
of the word "shall" in subsection (g) certainly cannot be read as imposing such a requirement. The word "shall" occurs throughout chapter 1 of title 23 of the United States Code, but provisions containing
the word are mandatory only if the state wants to obtain a certain
share of the federal-aid highway funds. This has been the universal
interpretation and uniform theory of administrative practice under
the federal-aid highway laws since their inception in 1916. Similarly,
as we have already seen, 85 the phrase "shall not be required to be removed" in subsection (e) of the same title of the Highway Beautification Act does not prohibit removal of nonconforming signs by the
states in less than the stated period of time but merely indicates that
no state is required to remove such signs in less than such period in
order to avoid the ten per cent penalty imposed under subsection (b).
All of the subcomittee hearings in 1965 proceeded on the assumption that the title I requirements were mandatory on the states only
in the sense that the states must comply with them in order to avoid
the ten per cent penalty. There is nothing in the hearings to indicate
that the subcommittee members intended to forbid absolutely the
use of any state's police power to eliminate highway advertising signs,
although it was clearly assumed that few, if any, states would be willing to suffer the ten per cent penalty in order to avoid payment of
just compensation to sign owners and landowners. Consequently, the
statement in the Senate committee report that "[s]uch payment is
mandatory, not permissive, on the States" 86 and the statement in the
House committee report that "compensation must be paid to those
individuals who will lose their signs" 87 must both be read as meaning
that payment of just compensation is mandatory if, and only if, a state
wishes to receive its full share of federal funds.
The floor debates proceeded on the same assumption as the subcommittee hearings.88 The amendment on the floor that added sec85.
86.
87.
88.

See text following note 52 supra.
See text accompanying note 59 supra.
1965 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 7.
See te.xt accompanying note 61 supra.
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tion 401 to the Highway Beautification Act89 can be considered an
admonition to the states not to take property unconstitutionally in the
course of implementing the Act, but it cannot reasonably be read as
imposing on them an absolute duty to compensate in the absence of a
con~titutional requirement.
As previously suggested,90 subsection (g) does not require the
states to pay just compensation upon removal of advertising signs
that were already unlawful on the date of the enactment of title I,
whether the signs were unlawful because they were erected in violation
of an existing state law or local ordinance or because they were maintained after the date set for removal by a valid state law or local ordinance enacted under the state's police power. Subsection (g) only directs that "just compensation shall be paid upon the removal of"
advertising signs either (I) lawfully in existence on October 22,
1965,91 or (2) lawfully on any highway made a part of the interstate
or primary system between October 22, 1965, and January I, 1968, or
(3) lawfully erected on or after January I, 1968. Category (I) is designed to include signs lawfully in existence along interstate or primary highways on October 22, 1965, that became nonconforming as a
result of the enactment of title I. Category (2) is designed to include
signs lawfully erected along federal-aid secondary or other highways
that became nonconforming when the highways were incorporated
into the interstate or primary systems during the period between October 22, 1965, and January I, 1968. Category (3) includes all signs
lawfully erected on or after January I, 1968, that later became nonconforming for whatever reason.
Even assuming that just compensation is clearly required in a
given case by subsection (g), how is the amount of compensation to be
determined? Subsection (g) provides that compensation shall be paid
for the following:
(A) The taking from the owner of such sign, display, or device of
all right, title, leasehold, and interest in such sign, display, or device;
and
(B) The taking from the owner of the real property on which the
sign, display, or device is located, of the right to erect and maintain
such signs, displays, and devices thereon.
89. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
90. See text accompanying notes 70-84 supra.
91. Note the discrepancy between subsection (e) with its cut-off date of September 1,
1965, and subsection (g) with its cut-off date of October 22, 1965. This discrepancy appears to be inadvertent.
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This provision, unfortunately, is perhaps the most ambiguous of
many ambiguous provisions in title I of the Highway Beautification
Act. Only one thing is really clear: Congress intended that compensation should be paid to both the sign owner and the landowner in
the usual case where the sign itself is not owned by the owner of the
land on which it is located and that, where one person owns both the
sign and the land, he is to receive all the compensation.
,vith respect to the interests of both the sign mvner and the landowner, it seems clear that any amount of compensation agreed upon
and accepted will satisfy the subsection (g) requirement of just compensation.92 But the agreed compensation will normally approximate
what the parties believe the sign owner and the landowner would receive in an eminent domain proceeding. Eminent domain proceedings themselves will probably have to be used in at least some caseg,
because the state will be unable to reach an agreement on compensation with the sign mvner, the landmvner, or both. Consequently, it is
necessary to try to ascertain what property interests are to be paid for
under subsection (g).
Subsection (g) says, first, that the sign owner is to be compensated
for the "taking ... of all right, title, leasehold, and interest in" his
signs. The reference to the sign owner's "leasehold" in the sign is confusing, since ownership implies an absolute property interest rather
than simply a leasehold. Probably the draftsman intended to require
compensation for the taking of the sign owner's "leasehold" in the
land in those cases where the sign is erected pursuant to a lease on
land not owned by the mvner of the sign. Presumably the reference to
a "leasehold" will be so construed, despite the defective draftsmanship.93 It should be noted, however, that the so-called "leasehold" of
the sign mvner is usually not really a leasehold estate carrying with it
an exclusive right to possession of a defined area for a term of years.
Instead, it commonly is some sort of easement or license.94 Since
"leases" that authorize the maintenance of signs on vacant land usually purport to lease "as much of the premises ... as may be necessary
for the construction of advertising structures or displays and supports
92. The criteria of the former Bureau of Public Roads for federal participation may
not, of course, allow full payment of 75 per cent of the amount agreed upon.
See U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, Dept. of Commerce, Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-9, 1J 5 (March 31, 1967) [hereinafter Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-9).
93. The California compliance law uses language based on the suggested construction. See text accompanying note 191 infra.
94. I .AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.4, at 184-85 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). Accord,
Wilson, Billboards and the Right To Be Seen from the Highway, 30 GEo. L.J. 723, 745-47
(1942).
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therefor," 95 without designating very precisely where within the tract
leased such structures are to be erected, and allow the lessor to use
the land for any purpose that will not interfere with its use for advertising purposes, it seems clear that such an arrangement really creates
an "easement for a term of years" rather than a true leasehold estate.
Some cases describe the interest created as a "license," but a license
by definition is revocable at the will of the landowner. Whenever the
advertising lease is for a definite term and indicates the intent of the
parties that it should not be revocable at the landowner's will, it
should be deemed to create an easement rather than a license.96
What about the sign o-wner's interest in the sign itself? When an
advertising sign is "annexed" to the land or to a building on the land
by the landowner himself, it seems clearly to meet the test of a "fixture," and thus to be real property, under either the strict English
rule97 or the American rule as stated in Teaff v. Hewitt. 98 But most
95. This wording is from standard lease forms used by Central Advertising Company
of Michigan. Other outdoor advertising companies use lease forms with slightly different
language, but the substance is generally similar.
96. Sometimes the instrument gives the outdoor advertising company the right to use
the land for advertising purposes for a short term, subject to the landowner's power to
terminate the company's rights on 30 days' notice in the event the property is sold, leased
for anything other than advertising use, or desired for building construction. Even such
an instrument--often termed a "letter of permission" rather than a "lease"-seems to
create an easement rather than a mere license, although the easement is subject to a
power of termination upon the occurrence of specified events. In some states, certain
rural advertising signs have been erected on the basis of a mere revocable permission or
license, but my understanding is that such licenses have generally been replaced by leases
creating easements since enactment of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965.
Whether the easement created by an advertising lease should be classified as an
"easement appurtenant" or an "easement in gross" is a more difficult question. In the
case of an off-premise advertising sign maintained by a roadside business establishment,
it can reasonably be argued that the easement created by the advertising lease is appurtenant to the property where the business is conducted. But it is more difficult to regard
the advertising plant of a standardized outdoor advertising company as a dominant tenement to which the easement created by an advertising lease is appurtenant-especially
since the plant consists largely of the very advertising structures that are erected and
maintained at various locations by virtue of the company's advertising leases. On the
whole, it would seem that the easement created by a lease to a standardized outdoor
advertising company is an easement in gross rather than an easement appurtenant. See,
e.g., Whitmier &: Ferris Co., Inc. v. State, 12 App. Div. 2d 165, 166, 209 N.Y.S.2d 247, 248
(1961); Rochester Poster Advertising Co. v. Smithers, 224 App. Div. 435, 436, 231 N.Y.S.
315, 318 (1928); Borough Bill Posting Co. v. Levy, 144 App. Div. 784, 789, 129 N.Y.S. 7'10,
743 (1911); Rochester Poster Advertising Co. v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 99, 102, 213 N.Y.S.2d
812, 815 (Ct. Cl. 1961). The same conclusion is reached in Wilson, supra note 94, at 74.
It is entirely possible, however, that some courts may classify these as easements appurtenant in response to the claims of the outdoor advertising companies for severance
damages.
97. The English rule requires attachment or affixation to the land, See 5 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY§ 19.2 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
98. The court in Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 530 (1853), defined a fixture as
possessing the following characteristics:
1st. Actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto.
2d. Appropriation to the use or purpose of that part of the realty with which it
is connected.
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advertising signs are erected on land owned by someone other than
the owner of the sign, pursuant to an advertising lease. In this situation of divided ownership, the American rule may create difficulties.
In the English common law, an exception to the rule that fixtures
become part of the realty and cannot be removed was made in the case
of tenants' "trade fixtures," which-although they were held to belong to the landlord while in place-could be removed by the tenant
at or before the end of his tenancy. 99 In the United States, most courts
have liberalized the English "trade fixture" doctrine substantially.100
However, in the process American courts have had great difficulty in
dealing with the question of whether fixtures that are removable by
a tenant are real or personal property while they are in place. Courts
have generally refrained from laying down a rigid rule for determining their character in all situations,101 but frequently, when their
precise legal character is not really in question, courts speak of removable fixtures as personalty, apparently thinking that this legal status
necessarily follows from the fact that the tenant can remove them.102
Strictly speaking, however, it would seem that removable tenant fixtures, like other fixtures, are part of the realty until removed, with the
tenant's right of removal existing apart from, and independently of,
his unquestioned right to remove any personal chattel that, although
it is on the land, has not become a part of the realty for any purpose.103 The view that removable tenant fixtures are personal property while in place is certainly inconsistent ·with the generally accepted rule that the tenant loses his right to remove fixtures, but not
mere personal chattels, if he fails to remove them from the leased
premises at or before the end of the lease term. 104
In practice, most courts recognize that removable tenant fixtures
are on the dividing line, in the "twilight zone" between real and personal property.106 However, the view that a removable tenant fixture
3d. The intention of the party making the anne.'\:ation, to make the article a
permanent accession to the freehold-this intention being inferred from the nature
of the article affi.'\:ed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation,
the structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose or use for which the an•
ne.'\:ation has been made.
(Emphasis original.) See generally 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 19.3 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952).
99. See 5 AMERICAN L\W OF PROPERTY § 19.2, at 11-14 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
100. Id. § 19.11, at 41-42. See generally 36A C.J.S. Fixtures §§ 33-42 (1961).
101. See, e.g., Pennington v. Black, 261 Ky. 728, 88 S.W.2d 969 (1935).
102. See, e.g., cases cited in 36A C.J.S. Fixtures § 37, at 686 n.48 (1961).
103. See, e.g., cases cited in id. § 37, at 686 n.50.
104. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.11, at 43-44 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952);
36A C.J.S. Fixtures § 41, at 693-94 (1961).
105. See, e.g., Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 238 N.W. 659 (1931). See also 5 AMERI•
CAN L\W OF PROPERTY § 19.11, at 42-43 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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is realty has generally been applied in connection with the taking of
land for public use, so that the condemnor must pay for the fixtures
as part of the realty but the compensation will go to the tenant because of his right of removal.106 Even if a removable tenant fixture is
considered as personalty between the landmvner and the tenant, the
courts almost uniformly take the position that this rule is entirely for
the protection of the tenant and cannot be invoked by the condemnor. As Nichols says, "[i]f the fixtures are attached to the real
estate, they must be treated as real estate in determining the total
award, but in apportioning the award they are treated as personal
property and credited to the tenant." 107 The Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 now
makes this rule binding on the states "to the greatest extent practicable under State law.'' 107a Thus, if signs erected pursuant to an
advertising lease are classified as removable tenant fixtures, as they
will be in most jurisdictions, a state highway agency taking such signs
pursuant to an advertising control statute would generally be compelled to pay for them as part of the realty.108
Suppose, however, that in a particular state it is determined that
an advertising sign is personalty rather than realty. In that case, after
the sign owner's leasehold in the land on which the sign is located has
been taken by the state, it may require him to remove the sign at his
106. This rule-stated in 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT Do:MAIN §§ 5.81[2], 5.83 (rev. 3d ed.

J. Sackman 1970); 4 id. § 13.12 (1971)-is supported by many cases. See, e.g., United States

v. Certain Property, 344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965); Carmichal v. United States, 273 F.2d
392 (5th Cir. 1960); Gilbert v. State, 85 Ariz. 321, 338 P.2d 787 (1959); City of Los Angeles
v. Hughes, 202 Cal. 731, 262 P. 737 (1927); Roffman v. Wilmington Housing Authority,
179 A.2d 99 (Del. 1962); Bales v. Wichita M.V.R.R., 92 Kan. 771, 141 P. 1009 (1914);
Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston & P.R.R., 209 Mass. 298, 95 N.E. 887 (1911);
Sheehan v. City of Fall River, 187 Mass. 356, 73 N.E. 544 (1905); State v. Peterson, 134
Mont. 52, 328 P.2d 617 (1958); Poillon v. Gerry, 179 N.Y. 14, 71 N.E. 262 (1904); In re
City of New York, 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931); Consolidated Ice Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 224 Pa. 487, 73 A. 937 (1909); North Coast R.R. v. Kraft Co., 63 Wash. 250,
115 P. 97 (1911).
107. 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 106, § 5.81[2], at 5-414.
107a. Pub. L. No. 91-646, § 305(1), 84 Stat. 1906 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4655(1)
(1970)).
108. City of Buffalo v. Michael, 16 N.Y.2d 88, 92, 209 N.E.2d 776, 777, 262 N.Y.S.2d
441, 442-43 (1965); Whitmier & Ferris Co. v. State, 12 App. Div. 165, 167, 209 N.Y.S.2d
247, 249 (1961); Rochester Poster Advertising Co. v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 99, 103, 213
N.Y.S.2d 812,816 (Ct. CI. 1961), affd. mem., 11 N.Y.2d 1036, 230 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1962); Stein
Brewery Co. v. State, 200 Misc. 424,426, 103 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949 (Ct. Cl. 1951). Some of the
state advertising control laws expressly provide that advertising signs shall be deemed
to be trade fixtures. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-ll-6(C)(I) (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 69, § 1280(b) (Supp. 1972). In a few states, however, the very existence of
the right of removal is a proper basis for the denial of compensation to the lessee for
the value of improvements in their unsevered condition. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore
v. Gamse, 132 Md. 290, 104 A. 429 (1918).
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own expense by virtue of the police power. 109 Would this be inconsistent with the just compensation requirement of subsection (g) on
the ground that subsection (g) requires either that the "title" of the
sign owner to the sign be taken and paid for before the sign is removed, or that, if the sign owner does retain his title, he be compensated for the cost of any removal that he is required to perform
himself? The language of subsection (g) provides no clear answer to
this problem, but I think it likely that the subsection will be held to
require compensation of the sign owner for his interest in the sign on
one basis or the other, even though it would be both constitutional
and in accord with state law to require removal of the sign without
further compensation once the sign owner's leasehold has been
taken. 110 In any case, the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 now requires state highway
agencies to pay for "actual reasonable expenses in moving ... personal property" or "actual direct losses of tangible personal property
as a result of moving ... a business ... operation" pursuant to any
federally assisted programs.11011
That portion of subsection (g) defining the compensation due to
the mmer of the land on which an advertising sign is located when
the sign is removed is also quite ambiguous. It is clear that the landmmer must be compensated for the loss of his rights under the existing advertising lease or other rental agreement with the sign owner.
But what about the landmmer's right to erect and maintain, or to
authorize others to erect and maintain, advertising signs in the future?
The use of the plural in the final phrase of subsection (g)111 suggests
109. Cf. Chaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964),
where, in dealing with the question whether the police power could be used to eliminate
lawfully erected signs made nonconforming by a state law designed to implement the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, the court said, "There is nothing to indicate that
they ever became fixtures so as to be part of the real estate." 176 Ohio St. at 440, 200
N.E.2d at 339. The implication was that if the signs were not "part of the real estate"
there would be no right to compensation for them when removal was required. But
Chaster Properties involved the constitutionality of a statute that did not provide for
compensation.
110. This conclusion is based mainly on the repeated statements during the Senate
and House hearings and debates, by proponents of compensation, that equity or fairness
requires payment of compensation even if the federal or state constitutions do not.
See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 43 (Sen. Randolph: "Perhaps [use of
police power without compensation] is legal, we would say, but is it equitable?"); 1965
House Hearings, supra note 21, at 46 (Rep. Edmondson: "The problem ••• may not
be so much constitutional as moral .•.").
110a. Pub. L. No. 91-646, § 202(a), 84 Stat. 1895 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)
(1970)). This provision is made applicable to state agencies under certain circumstances
by 42 U.S.C. § 4628 (1970).
111. In paragraph (A) of subsection (g), dealing with the sign owner's interest, the
singular is used: "all right, title, leasehold, and interest in such sign, display, or device"
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that Congress intended to require payment of just compensation for
the taking of what would amount to a permanent negative easement
in the land-that is, a perpetual restriction against erection and
maintenance of "such signs, displays and devices thereon." But the
congressional intent is not clear from the language of subsection
(g), and the legislative history is of little assistance on this point.112
Perhaps it would be more consistent with the traditional zoning
law approach to nonconforming uses to construe subsection (g) as
requiring compensation only for the loss of the landmmer's rights
under the existing lease or other rental agreement, thus permitting
the state to prohibit future erection of signs within the control
area through police power regulation. The former Bureau of Public
Roads seems initially to have adopted this construction, with one
minor qualification,113 but the current position of the Federal High(emphasis added). But in paragraph (B), dealing with the landowner's interest, the
plural is used: "the right to erect and maintain such signs, displays, and devices thereon"
(emphasis added).
112. The colloquy between Senators Holland and Randolph, Ill CoNG. REc. 23879
(1965), is inconclusive. Senator Holland said, "The Senator realizes that when it comes
to condemnation along the primary roads, it involves buying up easements of 600 feet
on each side of the roadway; does he not?" Senator Randolph replied, "Yes, where advertising structures are now maintained under agreements in effect on date of enactment
of the pending measure." Shortly thereafter, Senator Randolph said, "It is estimated
that we shall need approximately $180 million for the advertising rights for the interstate and the primary systems. This means that signs, as well as easements, where the
areas have been used for advertising, would be involved. \Ve do not contemplate the
payment for easements over all systems, but only where the rights-of-way have been
exercised." Ill CONG. REC. 23880 (1965).
Later in the Senate debate, Senator Allott said:
Mr. President, it is fairly easy to ascertain the cost of a sign. There is an invoice
somewhere; there is a check somewhere which will show how much the sign cost.
In addition to the sign, there is also the cost that the sign owner pays to the landowner for the use of the land for the erection of the sign.
But I point out also that included here-and it cannot possibly be avoided-is
payment to the landowner for the leasehold he has lost. No one can possibly begin
to estimate the cost to this country, when these particular items are capitalizedand paid for-and capitalization is the only way that these values can be ascertained.
For example, if an owner rents a space for the sum of S250 a year, the only
possible way that the owner can be compensated for the loss of his lease to the
sign owner is by the capitalization of that $250 or $500, or whatever it may be.
Ill CONG. REc. 24234. This statement clearly indicates that Senator Allott, at least,
thought that the interest taken from the landowner would be a perpetual negative easement. Otherwise, there would be no need to capitalize the annual sign rental to determine the landowner's compensation.
113. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-9, supra note 92, 11 5(a)(6), includes the
following provision: "Federal funds may participate in payments made to landowners
where existing signs are removed. While this payment is for the right to erect and
maintain the existing signs, it may, insofar as Federal reimbursement is concerned,
include purchase of the right to erect future signs in the control area under a si11gle
ownership until such time as the State control law is effective and an agreement with
Public Roads is executed or January I, 1968, whichever is earlier" (emphasis added).
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way Administration is not clear.114 If subsection (g) is construed as
requiring the state to take a permanent negative easement, the
seventy-five per cent federal share that the state will be entitled
to receive will be based on the amount required to compensate
the landowner for the taking of such an easement, but if subsection (g) is construed as requiring the state to take only the landowner's rights under the existing advertising lease, the federal share
will be calculated only with respect to such rights.
C.

The Constitutionality of Title I

The constitutionality of federal grants-in-aid to the states, including grants for highway purposes, is so well-settled as not to require
discussion. But the just compensation provision in subsection (g) of
title I of the Highway Beautification Act could raise a tenth amendment issue115 in so far as it directs the states to pay compensation upon
removal of nonconforming signs, even though the signs might constitutionally be removed by use of the police power without compensation.116 If subsection (g) were construed to make the payment of
compensation absolutely mandatory, the tenth amendment issue
would indeed be substantial. As we have seen, however, that construction must be rejected in favor of one that makes payment mandatory only to the extent that the states must pay just compensation if
they wish to obtain a full allocation of federal-aid highway funds and
avoid the ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b) of title l. 117
Under this construction of subsection (g), the tenth amendment argument is difficult for the states to make. As the Acting Attorney General
pointed out in his opinion sustaining the constitutionality of subsection (g),11 8 the Supreme Court has consistently upheld statutory
provisions conditioning the grant of federal funds upon state com114. 23 C.F.R. §§ 750.303(c), .3ll(c), .312 &: pt. 750, app. A, pts. V, VII (1973).
115. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people." Tenth amendment arguments typically raise the question
whether a federal program impinges upon the states' right of self-government or their
right to e.xercise the police power.
116. This is the second point discussed in the opinion of Acting Attorney General
Clark, issued in response to a request from the Secretary of Commerce. See 42 OP. ATIY.
Gm. No. 26, at 5-9 (1966). In Lamm v. Volpe, 449 F.2d 1202 (10th Cir. 1971), the court
affirmed a summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that plaintiff had no
standing as a Colorado citizen and taxpayer to raise the tenth amendment issue, and
that the case was moot because of the enactment in Colorado of "a just compensation
statute in compliance with ••• the Federal Act." 449 F.2d at 1205.
117. See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
ll8. 42 OP. ATIY. GEN. No. 26, at 5-9 (1966).
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pliance with certain federal standards.119 The only requirements appear to be that the "means ... are appropriate and plainly adapted
to the permitted end" 120 and that they not be arbitrary.121
The Acting Attorney General concluded that a ten per cent reduction in federal highway funds was an appropriate and well
adapted means to achieve one of the goals of the Highway Beautification Act. 122 I concur. The argument of Lamm and Yasinow that withholding federal highway funds is an arbitrary and unreasonable
method of securing compliance with the Act's beautification program123 is ill-conceived: It ignores the traffic safety argument for
billboard removal and does not recognize that aesthetic considerations
may be as important as engineering considerations in the creation
of a national highway system. Withholding federal highway funds
to induce compliance with the billboard removal provisions of the
Highway Beautification Act is not unrelated to the federal objectives
of the entire federal-aid highway program, although withholding
highway funds as a means of achieving nonhighway objectives would
lack the requisite relatedness and therefore be arbitrary and unreasonable.124 Given the close nexus between the objectives of the
Highway Beautification Act and the more general purposes of the
federal-aid highway program, it is unlikely that subsection (g) or any
other part of title I of the Act could be found to be constitutionally
defective.
119. E.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Commn., 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Massa•
chusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
120. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), quoted in Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Serv. Commn., 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). See also Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 590-191 (1937).
121. 42 OP. ATIY. GEN. No. 26, at 8 (1966).
122. Id. at 8-9.
123. The distinguishing element between the two cases cited by former Attorney
General Clark and a case which could arise under the Highway Beautification Act
of 1965 is obvious. In Massachusetts [v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)] matching funds
for maternal and child health care were to be denied where federally-approved programs designed for that purpose were not utilized. In Oklahoma [v. United States
Civil Sero. Commn., 330 U.S. 127 (1947)] a state highway official could be dismissed
by the Federal Government for violation of a federal law, where the Federal Gov•
ernment participated in highway development in that state. But under the 1965
Act, a state which refuses to participate in a national program of beautification not
only forfeits Federal Government participation in the state's beautification effort,
i.e., a 75 percent share of compensation payments, but must also sustain a 10 percent loss of federal funds for a defense-commerce project, the construction of highways. Analogous to the situation at hand would be a forfeiture of federal funds
used in the construction of a state's medical facilities as a result of the state's unwillingness to comply with a federal program of recreation-area development.
The two contentions appear equally preposterous.
Lamm &: Yasinow, supra note 48, at 446 (emphasis original).
124. With all due respect, the "analogy" drawn by Lamm and Yasinow, supra note
123, is "preposterous."
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STATE LEGISLATION

In General

The reaction of the state legislatures to title I of the Highway
Beautification Act was mixed. Some states rushed to enact compliance laws, while others delayed the adoption of any implementing
legislation for several years. By mid-1970, only thirty-two states had
enacted compliance laws. Only eighteen of these had legislation that,
as of July I, 1970, was deemed by the Secretary of Transportation to
be in full compliance with title I; of the remaining fourteen, nine
had legislation that clearly did not comply with title I, and five had
legislation raising substantial doubts as to its compliance. Fifteen
additional states had highway advertising control legislation enacted
for purposes other than that of complying with title I, the legislation
in ten of these fifteen states having been adopted wholly or partly to
qualify for the bonus provided by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1958. Three states had no highway advertising control legislation
at all.125
The delays in state legislative implementation of title I seem to
have been due to a number of factors, including the following:
(I) The bitter opposition of the billboard industry;
(2) Initial uncertainties as to whether title I would be construed
as mandating the payment of just compensation when lawfully
erected nonconforming signs were removed from control areas; 126
(3) The unwillingness of many states to authorize payment of
just compensation unless (a) funds were available to cover the
seventy-five per cent federal share and (b) there was a serious
threat that the Federal Highway Administrator would impose the
ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b) of title I;
(4) The failure of Congress to provide substantial funds for the
billboard program prior to fiscal year 1970, coupled with the 1968
amendment of title I adding subsection (n), which provides that no
advertising signs "shall be required to be removed under this section
if the Federal share of the just compensation to be paid upon removal
•.. is not available to make such payment" ;127 and
125. See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 42, at 23-29, £or a detailed discussion of the state
compliance laws.
126, This uncertainty was not resolved until (a) the Acting Attorney General issued
his opinion of November 16, 1966, 42 OP. ATIY. GEN. No. 26 (1966), discussed in text
accompanying notes 53-67 supra, and (b) the decision in Markham Advertising Co. v.
State, 7ll Wash. 2d 405, 439 P .2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 70-84 supra.
127. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 6(d), 82 Stat. 817 (codified at 2ll U.S.C. § 13l(n) (1970)).
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(5) The unwillingness of the Federal Highway Administrator
to impose the ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b) even
where a state made no attempt to comply with title l.128
Beginning in 1970, however, Congress provided substantial federal
funds for the billboard removal program, and the Federal Highway
Administrator put increasing pressure on the recalcitrant states to
adopt compliance laws, if they had not previously done so, and to revise existing billboard control legislation that did not fully comply
with title I requirements. As a result of this pressure, every state but
one now has a compliance law129 that the Secretary of Transportation
has found to meet the requirements of title l.130 The one exception,
South Dakota, brought suit in 1972 to challenge the Secretary's determination that its billboard control statute was not in compliance
with title I of the Highway Beautification Act as of January I, 1972,
128. The Secretary for the first and only time imposed the ten per cent penalty
on South Dakota, with respect to its fiscal-year allocation of federal-aid highway funds,
on March 1, 1972, to be effective March 31, 1972. His action was sustained in South
Dakota v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 335 (D.S.D. 1973), discussed in note 131 infra and accompanying text.
129. ALA. CoDE tit. 23, §§ 64(17)-(35) (Supp. 1971); ALAS. STAT.§§ 19.25.080-.180 (1972);
Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-711 to -720 (Supp. 1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-2501 to
-2512 (Supp. 1971); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5200-5486 (West Supp. 1973); Coto.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 120-5-1 to -28 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 13a-123 to
-123b (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1101-25 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 479.01-24 (1965), as amended, FLA. STAT, ANN. §§ 479.01-.24 (Supp. 1972); GA. Com;
ANN. §§ 95-2001 to -2020a (1972); HAWAII REv. STAT, §§ 264-71 to -90 (1968); IDAHO
CODE §§ 40-2811 to -2838 (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, §§ 501-16 (Supp. 1973);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 36-3501 to -3545 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 306B.I-.8,
306C.I0-.21 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 68-2231 to -2243 (1972); KY. REv. STAT.
§§ 177.830-.890 (1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.461-.461.8 (Supp. 1973); ME. REV. STAT,
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 2711-23 (Supp. 1972); MD. CODE ANN. art. 89B, §§ 226-35, 250-62 (1969),
as amended, MD. CODE ANN. art. 89B, § 252 (Supp. 1972); ch. 1070, [1971] Mass. Acts
1016 (partially codified at MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93D, §§ 1-7 (Supp. 1972)); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §§ 252.301-.324 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT, ANN. §§ 173.01-.27 (Supp. 1973);
MISS, CODE ANN. §§ 8059.5-01 to -17 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.500-.600 (Supp.
1973); ch. 2, [1971] Mont. Laws 2d Extraordinary Sess. 1816; NEB. REv. STAT, §§ 39-1302(36) to -(39), 39-1320.01 to .11 (Supp. 1972); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 410.220-.410 (1971); N.H.
REV. STAT, ANN.§§ 249-A:1 to :19 (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 27:7A-ll to -22 (Supp.
1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-11-1 to -7.1 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. HWY. LAW § 88 (McKinney
Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 136.126-.140 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT, CODE ANN.
§§ 24-17-01 to -15 (1970); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5516.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1972); OKLA.
STAT. ANN, tit. 69, §§ 1272-84 (Supp. 1972); ORE, REV. STAT. §§ 377.505-.545, .700-.992
(1971); PA- STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 2718.101-.115 (Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 2410.1-1 to -12 (1968), as amended, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 24-10.1-3, -6 (Supp. 1972); No.
930 [1971] S.C. Acts 2061; TENN, CODE ANN.§§ 54-2601 to -2617 (Supp. 1972); TEX. REv.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6674v-1, §§ 1-8, 10-15 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 27-12-136.1
to .13 (1969), as amended, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 27-12-136.2 to .11 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3683a, 3688 (1970), tit. 10, §§ 321-45 (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33.1351 to -381 (1970), as amended, VA. CODE ANN.§ 33.1-355 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 47.42.020-.911 (Supp. 1972), amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 47.42.010-.910
(1961); W. VA. CODE ANN.§§ 17-22-1 to -25 (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 84-30 (Supp.
1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-110 to -124 (Supp. 1971).
130. S. REP. No. 92-1081, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 SENATE
REPORT].
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and to compel the Secretary to pay the portion (ten per cent or $3,361,546.60) of the federal-aid highway funds withheld for fiscal 1973
to which South Dakota would otherwise have been entitled. In addition, South Dakota sought to overturn the Secretary's proposed determinations that, despite an amendment to the state's compliance
law enacted on February 17, 1972, and effective on July l, 1972, the
law was still not in compliance with title I and that the ten per cent
penalty should consequently be assessed against the funds to be apportioned to South Dakota for fiscal 1974 as well. In a recent decision
the United States District Court for the Southern District of South
Dakota entered a summary judgment upholding the Secretary's determinations on all points.131

B. Areas Subject to "Effective Control"
The areas adjacent to highways that are subject to "effective control" are generally defined in the state compliance laws in substan131. South Dakota v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 335 (D.S.D. 1973). In holding S.D. COMP.
LAws ANN. §§ 31-29-15 to -60 (1967), as amended, S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 31-29-20 to
-40 (Supp. 1972) (in force on Jan. 1, 1972), not to be in compliance with title I of the
Highway Beautification Act, the court sustained the Secretary's determinations that
(I) The statute's highway corridor zoning provisions (section 31-29-20), which establish
mileage zones along the interstate and primary highways, did not satisfy "traditional
zoning requisites" and were "not consistent with the Act's purpose." 3!:3 F. Supp. at 341.
For example, on Interstate 90, crossing the state from east to west, there would be only
two short segments, each about two miles long, in which billboards would not have been
permitted.
(2) Section 31-29-42 of the statute "precludes meaningful negotiations" for an agreement with the Secretary as to "unzoned" commercial and industrial areas by virtue of
the restrictive conditions contained therein. 353 F. Supp. at 341.
(3) The statute's "customary use" standards as to size, lighting, and spacing of permitted signs were "unacceptable" because they "failed to attain the level of any standards between a state and the Administrator previously accepted" by the Federal Highway Administrator. 353 F. Supp. at 341.
The court also held that the Secretary's "proposed determination" as to the 1972
amendments to the statute, ch. 171, [1972] S.D. Laws 198 (codified at S.D. CoMP. LAws
ANN. §§ 31-29-20 to -40 (Supp. 1972)), should not be reviewed de novo. 353 F. Supp. at
342-43. However, "in an effort to clarify the existing conflicts between the Secretary and
the State and to prepare a foundation for future acceptable legislation," the court gave
what seems in substance to be a declaratory judgment as to the 1972 amendments, as
follows:
(a) Section 31-29-20, despite the 1972 amendment, remains "arbitrary."
(b) The 1972 amendment to § 31-29-40 has partially corrected deficiencies in the size
and lighting provisions of the statute, "leaving spacing for further negotiations."
(c) The definition of "unzoned" commercial and industrial areas in§ 31-29-39 remains
unacceptable.
(d) Section 31-29-42 "locks the state negotiators in" and is still "too restrictive to
promote meaningful negotiations." 353 F. Supp. at 343.
In conclusion, the court "strongly" suggested "that the South Dakota Legislature
initiate immediate steps for appropriate legislation to correct these objectionable provisions," adding that it did so because, "even if I had the authority to rule on the 1972
laws which sought to bring the State into compliance with the Federal Act, I would find
them not in compliance, therefore placing the State in jeopardy of losing a second ten
per cent in its federal highway appropriations." 353 F. Supp. at 343-44.
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tially the same way as in title I of the Highway Beautification Act: as
areas "along the Interstate System and the primary system ... within
six hundred and sixty feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way and
visible from the main traveled way of the system." 132 However, a few
of the state compliance laws are more restrictive. In Colorado,133
Oregon, 134 Vermont,135 Washington,136 and "\,Vyoming,137 the controls
extend to any off-premises signs visible from the highway, and in
Utah,138 to any off-premises signs "capable of being read or comprehended with respect to advertising or informational content ... from
any place on the main-traveled way." The Oregon statute exempts
signs more than 660 feet from the highway within city limits "unless
the sign is designed to be viewed primarily from the state highway,'' 130
but it prohibits even on-premises signs "where one or more parts or
sides of the sign are so located as to be readable primarily by the
traveling public from any point on a limited access state highway if
there is no access to the sign premises within a distance of one mile
of such point on either side of the sign." 140
Some of the state laws impose controls on areas adjacent to turnpikes, 141 limited-access highways, 142 secondary highways, 143 or specially designated scenic highways, 144 as well as on areas adjacent to interstate and federal-aid primary highways.
C. Police Power Controls) Exceptions) and Permits
The state compliance laws without exception rely on the police
power to control future billboard construction along the interstate
and federal-aid primary highway systems. In accordance with title I
of the Highway Beautification Act, construction of new billboards
is prohibited within the controlled areas, with the common exceptions of (1) "directional and other official signs and notices,'' 1411 (2)
132. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(b) (1970).
133. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 120-5-2, -12, -18 (Supp. 1971).
134. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 377.715, .720 (1971).
135. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 328-35 (Supp. 1972).
136. WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§§ 47.42.030, .040, .062 (Supp. 1972).
137. WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 24-113 (Supp. 1971).
138. UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-136.4 (Supp. 1971).
139. ORE. REV. STAT. § 377.735(3) (1971).
140. ORE. REv. STAT. § 377.720(2) (1971).
141. E.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 177-840 (1971).
142. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 177-840 (1971).
143. E.g., Al.As. STAT. § 19.25.105 (1972).
144. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 47.42.020(7), .030 (Supp. 1972).
145. 23 U.S.C. § 131(c)(l) (1970).
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"signs ... advertising the sale or lease of property upon which they
are located," 146 (3) "signs ... advertising activities conducted on the
property on which they are located," 147 (4) all signs in areas "zoned
industrial or commercial under authority of State law," 148 and (5) all
signs in "unzoned commercial or industrial areas as may be determined by agreement between the several States and the Secretary
[of Transportation]."149
All the state compliance laws, except those in Alaska, Hawaii, and
Vermont, allow off-premises signs in areas "zoned industrial or commercial under authority of State law." The Kentucky statute, however, only allows off-premises signs "which otherwise comply with
the applicable zoning ordinances and regulations of any county or
city, and which are to be located in a commercially or industrially
developed area, in which the Commissioner of Highways determines,
in exercise of his sound discretion, that the location of such advertising devices is compatible with the safety and convenience of the
traveling public."150 Both Idaho and Texas have somewhat similar
restrictions on the location of signs in zoned commercial or industrial
areas. The Idaho statute provides that "areas abutting interstate and
primary highways . . . which are zoned commercial or industrial by
counties and municipalities shall be valid as commercial or industrial
zones only as to the portions actually used for commerce or industrial
purposes and [do] not include areas so zoned in anticipation of such
uses at some uncertain future date nor does it include areas so zoned
for the primary purpose of allowing advertising structures."151 The
Texas statute allows off-premises signs "in areas in which the land
use is designated industrial or commercial under authority of law,
such areas to be determined from actual land uses and defined by
regulations established by the [highway] commission.''152 In all three
states, it would seem that commercial or industrial zoning by local
governments is irrelevant unless the area is actually developed for
commercial or industrial uses.
All the states except Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Vermont,
and Washington (as to interstate highways only) allow off-premises
signs in unzoned commercial and industrial areas. All the states,
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

23 U.S.C. § 13l(c)(2) (1970).
23 U.S.C. § 13l(c)(3) (1970).
23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970).
23 U.S.C. § 13l(d) (1970).
KY. R.Ev. STAT. § 177.860(4) (1971).
IDAHO CODE § 40-2829 (Supp. 1972).
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6674v-l, § 4(A)(4) (Supp. 1972).
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except those listed above and South Dakota, now have statutes that
either contain firm definitions of unzoned commercial and industrial
areas that are satisfactory to the Federal Highway Administration as
a basis for the agreement benveen the state and the Secretary of
Transportation required by title I,153 or define such areas by reference
to a previously executed154 or prospective155 agreement between the
state and the Secretary.
All the states in which off-premises signs are permitted, except
South Dakota, now have either (1) firm statutory standards as to the
size, lighting, and spacing of such signs,156 (2) provisions for the definition of such standards by negotiation and agreement between the
state and the Secretary of Transportation,157 or (3) provisions for the
definition of such standards by regulations, consistent with national
standards or national policy, to be promulgated by the state highway
director or agency.158 The latter provisions have apparently been
construed to mean "determined by agreement between the several
States and the Secretary," since the Secretary has found all these states,
except South Dakota, to be in full compliance with title I of the
Act.159 In many cases, a statute first sets out firm standards and then
authorizes agreements with the Secretary without indicating what
the state highway agency is to do if the Secretary will not agree to the
statutory standards.160 In a few instances, the statute first sets out
"firm" standards and then authorizes the state highway agency to
"modify, vary or supplement" such standards in order to insure receipt of the maximum amount of federal-aid highway funds. 161 Other
statutes authorize the state highway agency to promulgate regulations
setting standards consistent with "customary use" and the policy of
the statute, and in agreement with the Secretary.162 In some states, the
standards in zoned commercial and industrial areas may be different
from those in unzoned commercial and industrial areas if the local
153. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5223 (West Supp. 1973).
154. See, e.g., N.Y. HWY. LAW § 88(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
155. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-2505 (Supp. 1971).
156. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2234 (1972).
157. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-3504 (Supp. 1972).
158. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 40-2833 (Supp. 1972).
159. See 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 15.
160. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 68-2234, -2235 (1972); KY. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 177.863,
.890 (1971 ).
161. See, e.g., LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 48.461.4 (Supp. 1973).
162. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-2505 (Supp. 1971).
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zoning regulations contain standards consistent with the statutory
policy.103
"[D]irectional and other official signs and notices ... which are
required or authorized by law" are generally excepted from the title
I ban on new signs in controlled areas but must "conform to national
standards . . . authorized to be promulgated by the Secretary . . .
which standards shall contain provisions concerning the lighting, size,
number, and spacing of signs . . . ." 164 Title I also authorizes the
Secretary, "in consultation with the States," to "provide within the
rights-of-way for areas at appropriate distances from interchanges on
the Interstate System, on which signs, displays, and devices giving
specific information in the interest of the traveling public may be
erected and maintained," such signs to "conform to national standards to be promulgated by the Secretary."165 With respect to these
classes of signs, most of the state statutes either incorporate the national standards promulgated by the Secretary,160 authorize the
promulgation of regulations consistent with the "national standards"
or "national policy," 167 or provide a general authorization for the
highway director or agency to enter into an agreement with the Secretary to implement the statute.168 Georgia, however, has more restrictive standards for directional signs than those promulgated by the
Secretary.160
Most of the states use a permit system to regulate the erection of
new billboards of the types permitted by their compliance laws.170
163. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 17, § lllO (Supp. 1970).
164. 23 U.S.C. § 13I(c)(l) (1970).
165. 23 u.s.c. § 131(£) (1970).
166. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7A-16(a) (Supp. 1972). The national standards
for "directional and other official signs" are set out in 23 C.F.R. §§ 750.151- .155 (1973);
the national standards for "official highway signs within interstate rights-of-way giving
specific service information for the traveling public" are set out in 23 C.F.R. §§ 750.201.210 (1973).
167. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120-5-12(b) (Supp. 1971) ("directional and other
official advertising devices and notices"); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-123(c) (Supp. 1973)
(applicable to "directional or other official signs and notices" permitted by § 13a123(e)(l)).
168. Se&, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § ll24 (Supp. 1970) ("signs, displays, and
devices providing information in the interest of the traveling public").
169. See GA. CODE ANN. § 95-2005a (1972).
170. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 120-5-18 to -21 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 17, §§ 1104, 1106 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 479.07-.10 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 95-2008a to -2010a (1972); IDAHO CODE §§ 40-2820 to -2826 (Supp. 1972); !LL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 508 (Supp. 1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2714 (Supp. 1972);
MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 173.03, .06, .07, .13 (Supp. 1973); Mrss. CODE ANN.§ 8059.5-06 (Supp.
1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 226.530 (Supp. 1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 249-A:4 (Supp.
1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:7A-14 to -17 (Supp. 1973); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5516.10

1334

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:1295

In some of these states on-premises signs are exempt from the permit
requirement.171 All the states that use a permit system provide that
a new billboard erected without the required permit is "illegal" and
may be removed in a relatively summary manner unless a permit
is obtained within a short grace period.172 In some states the permit
requirement also applies to existing billboards-conforming, nonconforming, or both.173 In some cases, permit provisions applicable
to existing signs appear to be designed to create so much red tape
that the sign owner will not bother to comply unless his sign is really
valuable.174 Some of the statutes provide that failure to apply for a
permit within a stated period creates a conclusive presumption of
abandonment of the sign.175
D. Nonconforming Signs: Removal and Determination of
Just Compensation
The provisions in the state compliance laws relating to removal of
nonconforming advertising signs and payment of just compensation
tend to incorporate some or all of the language of title I, subsection
(g) of the Highway Beautification Act. For example, the New York
compliance law authorizes the commissioner of transportation to
acquire and pay compensation for nonconforming signs "lawfully in
existence" on October 22, 1965 (the date of the enactment of the
federal Act), "lawfully along any highway made a part of the interstate or primary highway systems on or after" October 22, 1965, or
"lawfully erected on or after" January I, 1968. Compensation is to
be paid for "(a) the taking from the owner of such sign . . . of
all right, title, leasehold and interest in such sign, ... and (b) the
taking from the owner of the real property on which such sign . . .
is located, of the right to erect and maintain such signs ... thereon." 176
It should be noted that the New York statutory language almost(Page Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit, 69,

§

1277 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REv. STAT.

§ 377.725 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 36, § 2718.107 (Supp. 1973); TENN, CoDE ANN, 54-2604

to -2607 (Supp. 1972); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6674v-l, §§ 6-7 (Supp. 1972): UTAH
CODE ANN. § 27-12-1367 (Supp. 1971); WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 47.42.120 (Supp. 1972);
WYO. STAT, ANN, §§ 24-116 to -117 (Supp. 1971).
171. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 479,16 (1965); GA. CODE ANN,§ 95-2009a (1972); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 68-2236(a)-{c) (1972); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2715(1) (Supp. 1972).
172. See, e.g., MICH. COMP, LAws ANN. § 252.319 (Supp. 1973).
173. See, e.g., COLO, REv. STAT. ANN. § 120-5-18(1) (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN, tit.
17, ' 1104 (Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 95-2009a (1972).
174. See, e.g., MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 252,305-.312 (Supp. 1973).
175. See, e.g., COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 120·5-22(3)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1971).
176. N.Y, HWY, LAW§ 88(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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but not quite-literally reproduces the language of title I, subsection
(g) of the Act, with the result that no compensation is payable upon
removal of outdoor advertising signs lawfully erected along existing
interstate and primary highways between October 22, 1965, and January I, 1968, although compensation is payable upon removal of signs
lawfully erected along such highways before October 22, 1965, and
after January I, 1968-including those erected between January I,
1968, and the effective date of the New York statute, June 16, 1968.
But the New York statute requires payment of compensation upon
removal of all signs lawfully erected along secondary or other highways that become part of the interstate or federal-aid primary systems
at any time after October 22, 1965-whether before or after January
l, 1968. Many other state compliance laws literally repeat the language of title I, subsection (g), which does not cover those highways
converted after January I, 1968, and, consequently, exclude payment
of compensation upon removal of signs along such highways.177
The New York statute and others like it obviously discriminate
against persons with property interests in signs lawfully erected between October 22, 1965, and January I, 1968. A number of states,178
perhaps cognizant of the unfairness of this discrimination, have enacted compliance laws that provide for compensation upon the removal of any nonconforming sign lawfully in existence at the date
of enactment of the compliance law, although it appears that the
Federal Highway Administration will not authorize payment of the
federal share with respect to signs lawfully erected in the period
between October 22, 1965, and January 1, 1968.179 At least one state,
Florida, compensates for this latter fact with a statutory provision that
the general prohibition of removal of nonconforming signs unless
the federal share of the mandated just compensation is available
"shall not apply to signs erected between October 22, 1965, and
January 1, 1968."180 The Georgia statute, on the other hand, author177. See, e.g., CAL. nus.&: PROF. CODE§ 5412(b) (West Supp. 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § l.3a-123(t)(2) (Supp. 1973); KY. R.Ev. STAT. § 177.867(l)(b) (1971); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 8059.5-09 (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 33.l-370(e)(2) (1970).
178. Aus. STAT. § 19.25.140 (1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-2508 (Supp. 1971); GA.
CODE ANN. § 95-20ll(a) (1972): HAWAII REv. STAT. § 264-75 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 40-2831
(Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2238 (1972); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 461.6 (Supp.
1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 89B, § 254 (1969); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 252.322 (Supp.
1973); ch. 2, § 9, [1971] Mont. Sess. Law 2d Extraordinary Sess. 1816; N.H. R.Ev. STAT.
ANN.§ 249-A:ll (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 136-131 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 24-17-05 (1970); R.I. GEN. LAws § 24-10.1-6 (Supp. 1972); S.D. CoMP. LAws
ANN. § 31-29-50 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-136.ll (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-22-5 (Supp. 1970).
179. 23 C.F.R. § 750.308(a) (1973), restating the substance of title I, subsection (g).
180. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 479.24(3) (Supp. 1972),
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izes payment of compensation for the taking of "any property rights
in outdoor advertising signs ... lawfully in existence on the effective
date of this Chapter but which do not conform to the provisions of
this Chapter" and then goes on to provide that the State Highway
Department "shall be prohibited from paying more than 25 per cent
of any award for just compensation."181 Since the seventy-five per cent
federal share is not available for nonconforming signs erected between October 22, 1965, and January I, 1968, Georgia will not be
able to comply with both provisions if the signs are to be removed.
Nor can the signs be left in place, for in that case Georgia will not be
in compliance with title I of the Highway Beautification Act and will
be subject to the ten per cent penalty for failure to provide "effective
control" of highway advertising. 182
Several other state compliance laws contain provisions that seem
to be inconsistent with the provisions on the removal of nonconforming signs in title I of the Act. For example, the Minnesota statute
contains a declaration that "each advertising device in existence in
a business area on June 8, 1971, and which fails to comply with the
provisions of Laws 1971, Chapter 883, only as to size, lighting or
spacing may remain in place."183 The Nebraska statute contains a
similar provision. 184 But these provisions are in accord with the
agreements entered into benveen the states and the Secretary of
Transportation.185
Many of the state compliance laws allow a maximum of five years
for the removal of any nonconforming signs; the five years are to be
measured from the date when the signs became nonconforming under
the state law.186 Some state laws establish a date or a period prior to
181. GA. Com; ANN. § 95.201 la (1972).
182. See 23 U.S.C. §§ 13l(b)·(c) (1970).
183. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 173.26 (Supp. 1973).
184. "Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to require the removal of
signs in zoned and unzoned commercial and industrial areas ••. lawfully in e.xistence
on the effective date of this act, which signs may under this act remain and continue
in place even if nonconforming." No. 1181, § 7(2)(b)(vi), [1972] Neb. Laws 718
(emphasis added).
Signs "erected prior to the effective date of this act may continue in zoned or
unzoned commercial or industrial areas, notwithstanding the fact that such •.• signs
•.. do not comply with standards and criteria established by this act or regulations of
the department as promulgated from time to time." No. 1181, § 9, [1972] Neb. Laws
718.
185. See note 12 supra.
186. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120-5-28(3) (Supp. 1971) ("before January 1,
1976" but not until federal share is available, and no state funds to be used unless
the federal share is available); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 479.23 (Supp. 1972) ("by the end of
the fifth year after they have become nonconforming"); NEV. REv. STAT. § 410.340 (1971)
(with the exception that signs lawfully in existence on Sept. 1, 1965, must be removed
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which the removal of nonconforming signs may not be required.187
And other state compliance laws establish at least a general schedule
for the removal of nonconforming signs of different classes.188
As for the interests to be taken, many of the state compliance laws,
like the New York statute discussed above, 189 simply repeat the title I
language with respect to the sign owner's interest for which compensation is to be paid: "all right, title, leasehold, and interest in such
sign."100 But a few of the statutes spell out the interest more precisely.
For example, the California statute says, "all right, title, and interest,
including any leasehold interest, of the owner of the advertising display."191 Some of the state statutes, again like the New York statute,192
no later than July 1, 1973, or three years from the date funds are available for such
removal); OKI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1278(a) (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 84-30(5)
(Supp. 1973). For a three-year deadline, see WASH. R.Ev. CoDE ANN.§ 47.42.100(4) (Supp.
1972).
187. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 40-2830 (Supp. 1972) ("may not be required to be removed until July 1, 1970, unless required to be removed prior thereto by order of the
department," but "shall be removed on or before the end of the 60th month after it shall
become nonconforming, ••. provided ••• matching federal-aid funds are available'');
ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 121, § 509 (Supp. 1973) (only "after July 1, 1973"); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 36-3506 (Supp. 1972) (not within 60 months after erection and nQt before July 1,
1970, if sign was lawfully in existence on October 22, 1965; "any other sign lawfully
erected which does not on January 1, 1968, or at any time thereafter, conform to this
act, shall not be required to be removed until the fifth year after it becomes nonconforming''); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2237 (1972) (not until March 31, 1974, if "lawfully
in existence" on effective date and "not located in a business area"; removal of signs
later becoming nonconforming because located on a highway made part of the interstate or primary system after March 31, 1972, not be required to be removed until end
of the fifth year after they become nonconforming); ch. 1070, § 4, [1971] Mass. Acts 1017
(signs lawfully in existence on effective date of state act "shall not be required to be removed ••• until five years after" that date); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8059.508 (Supp. 1972)
(signs lawful but nonconforming on date of state act, not before July I, 1970; other
~igns, not until fifth year after they become nonconforming); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 226.570
(Supp. 1973) (not "until such removal is required by the secretary of transportation'');
Omo R.Ev. CoDE ANN. § 5516.07 (Page Supp. 1972) ("director shall not require the removal of any advertising device for which federal reimbursement is contemplated •••
unless, until, and to the extent that federal funds for the federal share have been
appropriated ••• and made available'').
188. See, e.g., ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 377.765(2)-(4) (1971).
189. See text accompanying note 176 supra.
190. 23 u.s.c. § 13l(g)(A) (1970). See, e.g., COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 120-5-28(3) (Supp.
1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 1122(b)(l) (Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 95-2012a(a)
(1972); IDAHO CODE § 40-2831(2)(a) (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 121, § 509 (Supp.
1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-3507 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2238(b)(l) (1972);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 8059.5-09(2)(a) (Supp. 1972); Mo. STAT, ANN. § 226.5701(1) (Supp.
197:3); No. 1181, § 4, [1972] Neb. Laws 714, amending NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 39-1320.01
(1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.109(b) (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-2608(b)
(Supp. 1972); TEX. R.Ev. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6674v-l, § 4(E) (Supp. 1972); WASH, R.Ev.
CODE ANN. 47.42.102(2) (Supp. 1972).
191. CAL. Bus. &: PROF. CODE § 5412 (West Supp. 1973).
192. See text accompanying note 176 supra. See also, to the same effect, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 17, § 1122(b)(2) (Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 95-2012a(b) (1972); IDAHO CODE
§ 40-28:31(2)(a) (Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-3507 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN.
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also simply repeat the title I, subsection (g) language with respect to
the landmvner',s interest for which just compensation must be paid:
"the right to erect and maintain such signs, displays, and devices." 193
This sounds as if the legislature intended payment to be made for all
future rights, in perpetuity, to erect and maintain such signs. But
other states, such as California,194 use the singular in referring to the
landowner's interest: "the right of the mvner of the real property on
which the advertising display is located to erect and maintain such
advertising display thereon." 195 This sounds as if the legislature intended to provide compensation only for the taking of the right to
maintain the existing advertising sign on the land in question. As
previously indicated,196 one of the difficult and still unsolved questions arising under title I, subsection (g) of the Highway Beautification Act is whether the states must pay compensation for the taking
of all of the landowners' present and future rights to maintain highway advertising signs on their land, or whether the landowners need
only be compensated for the taking of the present right to maintain
the existing advertising sign under the existing lease. Since the
Federal Highway Administration regards both the California and
the New York statutes, and statutes similar to either of them, as in
compliance with title I, it apparently does not consider the difference
in statutory language to be significant.
A number of the state compliance laws state categorically that any
removal of a nonconforming advertising sign shall be deemed a
"taking" of the interests of the sign owner and the owner of the
land on which the sign is located.197 This language surely is not intended to prohibit the state from negotiating agreements with the
O\vners of nonconforming signs and the land upon which such signs
are located for the purchase of their interests,198 or providing for the
§ 68-2238(b)(2) (1972); Miss CODE ANN. § 8059.09(2)(b) (Supp. 1972): Mo. STAT, ANN.
§ 226.570(1) (Supp. 1973); No. 1181, § 4, [1972] Neb. Laws 714, amending NEB. REv.
STAT.§ 39.1320.01 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 54-2608(b)(2) (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 47.42.102(2) (Supp. 1972).

193. 23 U.S.C. § 13l(g)(B) (1970) (emphasis added).
194. See text accompanying note 191 supra. See also, to the same effect, Coto. REv.
STAT. ANN, § 120-5-28(3) (Supp. 1971): ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 121, § 509 (Supp. 1973); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 249-A:ll(I)(b) (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV, STAT. § 377.780(3)(b) (1971);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.109(b) (Supp. 1973); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 667'1v•l,
§ 4(E) (Supp. 1972).
195. CAL. Bus. &: PROF. CODE § 5412 (West Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
196. See text accompanying notes 111-14 supra.
197. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. &: PROF, CODE § 5412 (West Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT,
§ 36-3507 (Supp. 1972).
198. Indeed, most of the state compliance laws expressly provide for either purchase
or condemnation of signs and advertising rights. See, e.g., ALAS. STAT, § 19.25.140

June 1973]

Billboard Control

1339

removal of such signs without acquisition of title thereto and compensating the sign owners on some other basis, such as the cost of
relocating the sign. Rather, this statutory language seems designed to
require the state to exercise the power of eminent domain in all cases
where a purchase or removal agreement cannot be negotiated and to
"take" and pay for all the property interests specified in the statute,
including the sign owner's interest in the sign itself. This will prevent
state highway agencies from acquiring all the real property interests
of landowners and sign owners by negotiated purchase or condemnation and then utilizing the police power to compel removal of the
signs without payment for the sign owners' interests in the signs themselves.199 The same objective is apparently also sought by provisions
-found in several state compliance laws-that all nonconforming .
highway advertising signs shall be deemed to be "trade fixtures" and
that sign owners shall be compensated for the signs' "fair market
value" when they are removed. 200 Such provisions will assure that, in
the valuation of the sign owner's property interest in eminent domain
proceedings, the value of the sign itself, "as part of the realty," will
be included. Presumably these provisions are intended to settle an
issue left unsettled by the states' existing case law. In any case, the
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 now requires the states, "to the greatest extent practicable under State law," to treat as real property any "structure" on
real property to be acquired pursuant to any federally assisted program, "notwithstanding the right or obligation of the tenant ... to
remove such ... structure." 200 a The Act also requires payment of the
cost of moving "personal property."2oob
West Virginia's compliance law expressly provides for determina(1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13al23(f)(2) (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 95-2011
(1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-3507 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2239 (1972); KY.
Rev. STAT. § 177.867(1) (1971); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 48.461.6 (Supp. 1973); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 2719(1)-(3) (Supp. 1972); l\IISS. CODE ANN. § 8059.5-09(1) (Supp.
1972); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 24-17-05 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-136.11(1)
(Supp. 1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-22-6 (Supp. 1970); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 24-119
(Supp. 1971).
199. See text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
200. See, e.g., N.l\I. STAT. ANN. § 55-11-6(B)(l) (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
69, § 1280(b) (Supp. 1972). See also OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5516.08 (Page Supp. 1972)
(compensation shall be paid as in other highway acquisition cases, "notwithstanding
the right or obligation of the owner of such advertising device, as against the owner
of the real property on which the ••• device is located, to remove such device at any
time').
200a. Pub. L. No. 91-646, § § 302, 305, 84 Stat. 1905-06 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 4652,
4655 (1970)).
200b. Pub. L. No. 91-646, § 202{a)(l), 84 Stat. 1895 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(l)
(1970)).
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tion of "the compensation to which the owner of the sign and leasehold interest is entitled, separate and apart from the compensation
to which the o-wner of the real property is entitled."201 This provision
was apparently included to prevent the application of the "unit rule,"
which ordinarily requires that the entire interest taken by eminent
domain (usually a fee simple estate) be valued as a unit, without regard to division of ownership between lessor and lessee or life tenant
and remainderman. The New Mexico statute contains a similar
provision.202
Perhaps the most interesting state statutory variation from the
language of title I, subsection (g) is the provision for payment of
severance damages found in the compliance laws of at least three states
-Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The Utah statute provides: "For
the purposes of this act, just compensation shall include, the consideration of damages to remaining properties, contiguous and noncontiguous, of an outdoor advertising sign company's interest, which
remaining properties, together with the properties actually condemned, constituted an economic unit." 203 The ·wyoming provision
provides that "just compensation shall be deemed to include severance damages to the remaining property, taking into consideration the
unique nature of outdoor advertising as affected by this act ...." 204
The Wisconsin statute provides that compensation shall include
"severance damages to the remaining signs which have a unity of use
and ownership with the sign taken ... excluding any damage to factories involved in manufacturing, erection, maintenance or servicing
of any outdoor advertising signs or displays." 205
No prior law in these states either holds or suggests that an advertising plant is an entity for eminent domain purposes in such a way
that the taking of one or more signs would give rise to severance
damages consisting of the "damages to the remainder of the outdoor
advertising plant."206 Therefore, the question may fairly be raised
whether federal funds can be made available under title I, subsection
(g) for payment of seventy-five per cent of the "severance damages"
determined in accordance with the Utah, Wisconsin, and ·wyoming
201. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 17-22-6 (Supp. 1970).
202. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55011-6(b) (Supp. 1971).
203. UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-136.11(2) (Supp. 1973).
204. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 24-119(b) (Supp. 1971).
205. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 84.30(7) (Supp. 1973).
206. Severance damages may arise in cases of partial taking if the difference between the value of the entire property before and after the taking is greater than the
value of the part taken. The outdoor advertising plant includes all the advertising
company's signboards, sign structures, storage buildings and areas, and office buildings.
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statutes. The position of the former Bureau of Public Roads was
made clear in its Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-9, issued
on l\farch 31, 1967, which stated: "Each sign shall be treated as a
separate entity without regard to the effect its removal will have on
the business operation of the owner."207 However, Federal Highway
Administrator Bridwell apparently moderated the Bureau's position
during his testimony at the 1967 Senate Hearings, in the course of
which he said that the Department of Transportation had "no policy
against" the payment of severance damages and that the Department's
policy was to "pay for what a court determines to be just compensation."208 He was less certain, however, as to the effect of a state statute
mandating payment of severance damages.209 The current position
of the Federal Highway Administration is as follows:
Generally, Federal participation will not be allowed in the payment
of damages to remaining signs, or other property of a sign company
alleged to be due to the taking of some of the company's signs. Unity
of use of the separate properties, as required by applicable principles
of eminent domain law, must be shown to exist before participation
in severance damages will be allowed. Moreover, the value of the
remaining signs or other real property must be diminished by virtue
of the taking of such signs. Payments for damages to economic plants
or loss of business profits are not compensable. The State shall have
the burden of justifying the recognition of severance damages pursuant to FHWA right-of-way procedures and the law of the State
before Federal participation will be allowed. 210
A complicating factor in Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming is that
all three compliance laws appear to prohibit the removal of any nonconforming sign unless federal participation in the payment of the
required compensation is assured. 211 There are obvious possibilities
for substantial delay in the removal of nonconforming signs if these
states attempt to carry out their statutory mandates to pay severance
damages to highway advertising companies and the Federal Highway
Administration is unwilling to participate in the payment of such
damages. 212
207. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-9, supra note 92, fi 5a(7).
208. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 28, at 33.
209. Id. See also id. at 457.
210. 23 C.F.R. § 750.3ll(d) (1973). The Federal Highway Administration's prohibition against compensation for "loss of business profits" is echoed in Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 5516.08 (Page Supp. 1972), which provides that in any action to appropriate
advertising signs and associated property rights "loss of business shall not be considered
an item of compensable damages."
211. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 27-12-136.11(2) (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 84.30(15)
(Supp. 1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 24-119(c) (Supp. 1971).
212. It should be noted that several other states have statutory provisions that
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Several other state compliance laws contain provisions relating to
payment of just compensation that raise doubts either as to their
validity under state constitutional limitations or their compliance
with title I of the Highway Beautification Act. The Florida statute,
for example, provides that compensation shall be paid for removal
of "signs lawfully in existence on December 8, 1971 or signs which
later became nonconforming," but compensation for any sign erected
or completed after December 8, 1971, "shall be limited to the actual
replacement value of the materials in such sign." 213 And another
subsection provides: "It is presumed that any party erecting a sign
after July I, 1971 did so with the knowledge of the existing federal
legislation and the pendency of this legislation. The measure of
damages on condemnation of any such sign shall be limited to the
replacement value of the materials used in construction of such
signs."214 If payment of compensation is not constitutionally mandated and is provided only to comply with subsection (g) of title I
of the federal Act, it is probable that the legislature may prescribe
and limit the method of valuation to be applied, even though the
form of an eminent domain proceeding is used. But in a state where
it is held that the state constitution requires payment of compensation
when lawfully erected nonconforming signs are removed, it is at least
arguable that the legislature cannot constitutionally restrict the exercise of the judicial function by prescribing a particular method of
valuation in eminent domain proceedings to the exclusion of other
judicially sanctioned methods.215
In contrast to the Florida law, the Georgia statute requires payment of "the actual financial loss suffered by the lessee under a written
preclude removal of nonconforming advertising signs unless and until federal matching
funds are available under title I, subsection (g). See, e.g., CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 120·
5-28(4) (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 1122(b)(2) (Supp. 1970); IDAHO CODE §
40-2830 (Supp. 1972); !LL. ANN. STAT. tit. 121, § 509 (Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 36-3513 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2242 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 173.25
(Supp. 1973); Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 226.570(1)-(2) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. HWY. LAW § 88(7)
(McKinney Supp. 1972); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 24-17-05 (1970); OHIO R.Ev. CODE ANN.
§ 5516.07 (Page Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1283 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.109(d) (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. 54-2608(b) (Supp. 1972);
WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN.§ 47.42.105 (Supp. 1972).
CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE § 5417 (West Supp. 1973), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 336
(Supp. 1972), provide, in substance, that no compensation is to be paid upon removal of
nonconforming signs unless and to the extent that such payment is required by federal
law as a condition for payment to the state of a full share of federal highway funds.
213. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 479.24(1) (Supp. 1972).
214. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 479.24(5) (Supp. 1972).
215. Courts have generally sanctioned use of the "comparable sales" and "income"
methods of valuation, as well as the "cost" method, and have ordinarily rejected the
view that any one method must be used to the exclusion of the others.
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lease expressly and solely permitting the erection and maintenance of
a sign ... (which was lawful on the date such lease was executed),"
even if the sign was never in fact erected because the State Highway
Department refused to issue a permit for its erection.216 The Georgia
statute thus recognizes the lease itself as a kind of lawful nonconforming use and requires payment of compensation when the lease is
rendered valueless because the enactment of the compliance law
precluded erection of a sign at the lease site. But it seems clear that
such payments are not eligible for federal participation under title
I, subsection (g) of the Highway Beautification Act, 217 and this fact
is likely to cause serious difficulties since another provision of the
Georgia statute prohibits the State Highway Department "from paying more than 25 per cent of any award for just compensation."218
Moreover, the prohibition in the Georgia compliance law against
payment of any compensation "for any leasehold interest to land more
than 100 feet from the public highway right-of-way" 219 is clearly inconsistent with title I, subsection (g), unless the prohibition is construed to apply only to the additional compensation provided for
lessees and lessors unable to obtain a permit for the erection of a sign.
The Maine statute authorizes payment of compensation when the
immediate removal of nonconforming signs is required, but
when immediate removal of nonconforming advertising signs is not
required but removal via regulation over an extended period of time
is satisfactory, the [state highway] commission is authorized to use the
police power of the State to establish a reasonable amortization period
which will be long enough to allow recoupment of the capital investment which these nonconforming signs represent but which contemplates that at the end of this period the nonconforming sign will be
removed by the owner without compensation.22 0

The New Hampshire statute provides that "[i]n calculating just com216. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 95-2012a(c)-(d) (1972). Both subsections (c) and (d) contain
the proviso "that the amount of compensation paid may not exceed the pro rata part
of the entire rental paid and to be paid under such leases for the unelapsed portion
thereof remaining on the effective date of this Chapter."
217. The title I, subsection (g) requirement of payment of just compensation applies only "upon the removal of ••• outdoor advertising signs, displays, and devices,"
and the federal share of the required just compensation is to be paid only for the
taking of the property rights of "the owner of such sign, display, or device" and "the
owner of the real property on which the sign, display, or device is located." 23 U.S.C.
§ 13l(g) (1970). This clearly precludes any federal participation where only lease rights,
unconnected with an actual sign located on a particular tract of land, are compensated.
218. GA. CoDE ANN. § 95-20lla (1972).
219. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 95-2012a(c),(d) (1972).
220. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2719(7) (Supp. 1972).
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pensation to be paid to the owner of an advertising device to be removed by reason of nonconformity ... after January I, 1975, it is
intended that the five year period of nonconforming use shall be
considered as whole or partial compensation to said owner for his
loss." 221
If the Maine and New Hampshire statutory provisions are construed simply to mean that depreciation is to be taken into account
in determining the value of a nonconforming sign at the time of its
removal, there is no problem. But if these provisions are construed
to mean that the "value" of a sign may be reduced in accordance with
a schedule that bears no relation to the actual depreciation and that
the period of non-conforming use may be considered to be the full
compensation to which the owner of the sign is entitled even though
the sign still has actual value at the time of removal, they are clearly
inconsistent with the mandate of title I, subsection (g) for payment
of just compensation. Since the Federal Highway Administration
now regards both the Maine and New Hampshire statutes as complying with title I, it has apparently adopted the first construction.
Washington, which, in 1961, adopted legislation to implement
the bonus provisions of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 by providing for the elimination of nonconforming billboards through the
use of the police power, 222 has provided in its compliance law under
the Highway Beautification Act that no compensation shall be paid
for signs "which became subject to removal pursuant to" the 1961
legislation "prior to May 10, 1971."223 This provision would clearly
be consistent with title I of the Highway Beautification Act if it exempted from the compensation requirement only those signs that
became unlawful and subject to removal under the 1961 Washington
billboard legislation prior to October 22, 1965, the date of the enactment of the Highway Beautification Act. If that were the case, indeed,
the provision would simply codify the holding in Markham Advertis221. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 249A-ll(VI) (Supp. 1972). The following language ap•
pears immediately after the provision quoted in the text:
·
It is further intended that, in calculating just compensation to the owner of the
land for which rental compensation has been paid for the five preceding years,
such rental income during the period of nonconforming use be taken into consideration as whole or partial compensation. If funds become available, the commissioner of public works and highways is authorized to negotiate the removal
of advertising devices prior to the end of the five-year period and is authorized
to pay just compensation.
222. Ch. 96, [1961] Wash. Laws 1575, as amended, ch. 3, § 55, [1963] Wash. Laws
Extraordinary Sess. 1323, as amended, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 47.42.100 (Supp. 1972).
223. WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN.§ 47.42.102(3) (Supp. 1972).

June 1973]

Billboard Control

1345

ing Co. v. State 224 that title I does not require that compensation be
paid upon the removal, pursuant to the 1961 legislation, of signs that
became unlawful and subject to removal on March 11, 1964 (signs not
located in areas zoned commercial or industrial), or on March 11,
1965 (signs located in areas zoned commercial or industrial). But the
exemption from the compensation requirement of all signs, if any,
that became subject to removal, pursuant to the 1961 legislation,
"prior to May 10, 1971," seems inconsistent with title I. This conclusion follows not only from the language of title I, subsection
(g)(l)-(3), but even more clearly from the final sentence in subsection
(j), which expressly states that the provisions of that subsection relating to continuation of bonus payments under the 1958 Federal-Aid
Highway Act "shall not be construed to exempt any State from controlling outdoor advertising as otherwise provided in [title I]."
Perhaps the strangest statutory treatment of the just compensation requirement is to be found in the Michigan compliance law.
Although the statute clearly implies that off-premises signs not located
in commercial or industrial areas "may be removed" by the state
highway department, the section dealing with just compensation
requires that compensation be paid only "upon the removal ... of
any sign or sign structure lawfully in existence on the effective date
of this act but which does not comply with the requirements of sections 15, 16 and 17 and any sign or sign structure lawfully erected
after the effective date of this act but which thereafter becomes unlawful because of a change in the designation of the highway or in
the zoning of the area in which it is located."225 Since sections 15, 16,
and 17 of the Michigan statute relate only to standards for size, lighting, and spacing of signs in commercial or industrial areas,226 the
Michigan statute does not expressly require payment of any compensation upon the removal of off-premises signs lawfully in existence on
the effective date of the act in areas other than commercial or industrial areas; these are illegal simply by virtue of section 13 of the
statute.227 In view of this strange omission it is hard to see how the
Michigan statute can be deemed to be in compliance with title I
of the Highway Beautification Act, although the Federal Highway
Administration has found that it complies.228
22·1-. 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
See text accompanying notes 70·84 supra.
225. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 252.322 (Supp. 1973).
226. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 252.315-.317 (Supp. 1973).
227. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 252.313 (Supp. 1973).
228. See 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 15.
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The Michigan statute, which is in many other respects poorly
drafted, also leaves in doubt the status of advertising signs that were
unlawfully erected between September 14, 1966, the effective date
of an earlier compliance law, 229 and March 31, 1972, the effective date
of the current compliance law. 230 No attempt was made to enforce the
police power prohibition against erection of new off-premises billboards in areas other than commercial and industrial areas after
September 14, 1966; in fact, a very large number of new, "illegal"
billboards were erected. Since the current compliance law repeals
the earlier law but makes no express reference to billboards erected
in violation of the earlier statute, it is impossible to be sure whether
such billboards are to be deemed "lawfully in existence on the effective date of" the current statute. The Michigan billboard industry,
as might be expected, has taken the position that the billboards are
to be regarded as "lawfully in existence." Of course, if the current
Michigan statute is literally construed as not requiring payment of
compensation upon removal of such signs, even though lawfully in
existence on its effective date, the issue becomes unimportant.

E.

Constitutionality of the State Legislation
I. Police Power Controls

All the current state outdoor advertising control laws rely on the
police power in some measure to control the erection and maintenance of signs within specified areas adjacent to various types of highways. A determination that a given regulation is a valid police power
measure ipso facto establishes that it is not a taking of private property for public use that gives rise to a constitutional right of just
compensation. The case law dealing with the regulation of outdoor
advertising is now extensive enough to justify the conclusion that
state laws prohibiting erection of new advertising signs within specified areas adjacent to public highways are constitutionally valid even
if they make no provision for compensating landowners for the loss
of the right to devote their land to advertising uses.
The business of outdoor advertising on a commercial basis dates
from the 1880's. Under the common law, advertising posters that for
any reason were regarded as offensive or dangerous were dealt with
under the doctrine of nuisance. From the 1890's onward, however,
large-scale commercial promotion of billboard advertising became
229. No. 333, [1966] Mich. Acts 613.
230. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 252.301-.324 (Supp. 1973).

June 1973]

Billboard Control

1347

so aggTessive and its methods so -crude as to provoke prohibitory legislation, usually in the form of municipal ordinances.231
In the early cases the courts were generally hostile to these prohibitory ordinances, and numerous billboard ordinances were declared unconstitutional. The courts said that billboards were not
nuisances in fact and could not be made so by legislative fiat. Aesthetic
considerations were held insufficient to support use of the police
power to impose rather modest restrictions upon the location of billboards.232 Even ordinances with the limited purpose of protecting
the appearance of public parks and boulevards by restricting the
placing of billboards near such places were disapproved. 233 The rationale of many of these early court decisions was stated by a conservative New Jersey court as follows: "Aesthetic considerations are
a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is
necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to
take private property without compensation." 234
Even in the early 1900's, however, cases may be found upholding
the validity of municipal billboard regulation on the dual grounds
of safety and amenity.235 The decision generally credited with having
the greatest influence in changing judicial attitudes toward billboard
regulation is St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St.
Louis.236 In an opinion covering 124 pages, the Missouri court discussed the evolution of the law up to that time and upheld a municipal ordinance regulating the size, height, and location of billboards.
In an oft-quoted passage, the court said:
231. See generally Proffitt, Public Esthetics and the Billboard, 16 CORNELL L.Q.
l!H (1931); Baker, Aesthetic Zoning Regulations, 25 MICH. L. REv. 124 (1926).
232. E.g., Anderson v. Shackleford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 S. 343 (1917), overruled in part
on other grounds, Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 S.2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 (1905), overruled by
General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193
N.E. 799 (1935); St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99,
137 S.W. 929 (1911), dismissed per stipulation, 231 U.S. 761 (1913); Kansas City Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of Kansas City, 240 Mo. 659, 144 S.W. 1099 (1912); Bill
Posting Sign Co. v. City of Atlantic City, 71 N.J.L. 72, 58 A. 342 (Sup. Ct. 1904); City
of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285,
62 A. 267 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1905); State v. Whitlock, 149 N.C. 542, 63 S.E. 123 (1908);
Bryan v. City of Chester, 212 Pa. 259, 61 A. 894 (1905).
233. Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E.
920 (1911); Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601
(1905), overruled by General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works,
289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935).
234. City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72
N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905).
235, See, e.g., In re Wilshire, 103 F. 620, 623-24 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1900).
236, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), dismissed per stipulation, 231 U.S. 761 (1913).
See also St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919).
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[T]here is but one virtue connected with this entire [outdoor advertising] business, and that is the advertising itself. This is a legitimate
and honorable business, if honorably and legitimately conducted,
but every other feature and incident thereto have evil tendencies,
and should for that reason be strictly regulated and controlled. The
signboards upon which this class of advertisements are displayed are
constant menaces to the public safety and welfare of the city; they
endanger the public health, promote immorality, constitute hiding
places and retreats for criminals and all classes of miscreants. They
are also inartistic and unsightly.
In cases of fire they often cause their spread and constitute barriers against their extinction; and in cases of high wind, their temporary character, frail structure and broad surface, render them
liable to be blown down and to fall upon and injure those who may
happen to be in their vicinity. The evidence shows and common
observation teaches us that the ground in the rear thereof is being
constantly used as privies and the dumping ground for all kinds of
waste and deleterious matters, and thereby creating public nuisances
and jeopardizing public health; the evidence also shows that behind
these obstructions the lowest form of prostitution and other acts of
immorality are frequently carried on, almost under public gaze; tl1ey
offer shelter and concealment for the criminal while lying in wait for
his victim; and last, but not least, they obstruct the light, sunshine
and air, which are so conducive to health and comfort.231

Although the Missouri court, in the passage set out above, expressly mentioned the fact that signboards are "inartistic and unsightly," at a later point in its opinion it made it clear that, in its
view, aesthetic considerations alone were insufficient to sustain the
regulatory ordinance:
As to the third class of cases, ... those which hold such ordinances
invalid because they show upon their faces that they were enacted
solely for aesthetic considerations and not for the good of the public,
they are unquestionably sound; and no court should uphold an _ordinance which has no better reason than that to commend it to the
lawmaker and the courts. If the necessity or reasonableness of such an
ordinance should be tested by such a standard, then the standard itself
would be hard to establish, for the reason that all do not have the
same tastes or ideas of beauty; what would please one might not
please another.... A statute or ordinance conforming to the tastes
and ideas of beauty passed [sic] by the body of lawmakers who enacted
it might and probably would in most instances be distasteful to a
majority of the people of the city; and especially is that true as regards this class of legislation. . . . Property rights should never be
subjected to such fickle standards of regulation, especially when they
are devoid of all substantial benefit to the citizens.23 B
237. 235 Mo. at 144-45, 137 S.W. at 942.
238. 235 Mo. at 202, 137 S.W. at 961.
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The fact that the record of St. Louis Gunning and similar billboard cases supplied little evidence to support the health, safety, and
morals justifications for regulatory legislation has been demonstrated
by other ·writers.239 But many courts followed the lead of the Missouri
court in upholding, on health, safety, and morals grounds, billboard
regulations that were, in fact, primarily based on aesthetic grounds.240
The rationale was widely employed even under circumstances that
rendered its factual basis less convincing than it was in St. Louis
Gunning. 241 Nor was it discarded in later cases that exposed and gave
substantial weight to the aesthetic considerations that were in large
part the motivation for such regulatory legislation.242
Growing appreciation of the close relationship between the value
of property and the amenity of its surroundings had a significant
practical effect on judicial views as to the scope of the police power.
This relationship was noted when the United States Supreme Court,
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,243 provided a solid constitutional footing for comprehensive zoning and thus made available a
natural framework for including outdoor advertising regulations in
ordinances that regulated land use in other respects. The past sixty
years have witnessed a gradual acceptance by the courts of a broader
definition of general welfare than prevailed at the time of the St.
Louis Gunning case. One aspect of this change in judicial attitude
is the increasing number of opinions sustaining outdoor advertising
controls that frankly expose their primary aesthetic purpose.244 Recent
239. See, e.g., Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20
L\w &: CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955); Proffitt, supra note 231, at 151.
240, See, e.g., Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 344, 108 N.E. 340
(1914), affd., 242 U.S. 526 (1917); People ex rel. Publicity Leasing Co. v. Ludwig, 218
N.Y. 540, 113 N.E. 532 (1916); State v. Staples, 157 N.C. 637, 73 S.E. 112 (1911); Horton
v. Old Colony Bill Posting Co., 36 R.I. 507, 90 A. 822 (1914); Cream City Bill Posting
Co. v, City of Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 86, 147 N.W. 25 (1914).
241. See, e.g., Whitmier &: Filbrick Co. v. City of Buffalo, 118 F. 773 (C.C.N.Y. 1902);
Murphy v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); Hav-A-Tampa Cigar
Co. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 S.2d 433 (1941); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297
U.S. 725 (1936); State v. Staples, 157 N.C. 637, 73 S.E. 112 (1911); Landau Advertising
Co. v, Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 387 Pa. 552, 128 A.2d 559 (1957); Liggett's Petition,
291 Pa. 109, 139 A. 619 (1927).
242, E.g., National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375,
27 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1962); Murphy v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177
(1944): General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149,
193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936).
243. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Supreme Court had previously held that billboards
may be excluded from residence zones. Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242
U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269
(1919).
244. The rationale for basing billboard regulations on a broader concept of the
general welfare that would include aesthetic factors was first stated in Churchill &:

1350

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:1295

cases sustaining aesthetic controls tend to rely at least in part on the
ground that such controls promote the general welfare by preserving
property values or valuable tourist attractions. 245 A recent New Jersey
Supreme Court opinion epitomized the aesthetic-property value rationale as follows: "There are areas in which aesthetics and economics
coalesce, areas in which a discordant sight is as hard an economic fact
as an annoying odor or sound. We refer not to some sensitive or exquisite preference but to concepts of congruity held so widely that
they are inseparable from the enjoyment and hence the value of
property." 246
The aesthetic-property value rationale is probably most persuasive when it is used to sustain municipal land use regulations (usually
zoning regulations) that apply to urban areas247 or land use restrictions designed to maintain scenic beauty in areas that attract large
numbers of tourists; it is least persuasive when used to sustain land
use regulations in rural areas with little scenic value. But it is pretty
clear that preservation of scenic beauty along highways, both to proTait v. Rafferty, 32 Philippines 580 (1915), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 591 (1918). Other
important cases include Murphy v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177
(1944); Merritt v. Peters, 65 S.2d 861 (Fla. 1953); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50
Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202
Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub.
Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936); Crom•
well v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); Perlmutter v.
Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932); People v. Sterling, 128 Misc. 650, 220 N.Y.S.
315 (Sup. Ct. 1927); State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
See also State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968) Gunkyard); Oregon
City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965) (auto wrecking yard). Cf. State ex rel.
Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 S. 440 (1923). The broadest general
welfare rationale for aesthetic regulation is provided by Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954).
245. Murphy v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944) (billboardsproperty values); Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 S.2d 611 (Fla. 1960) (advertising
signs-tourism); Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 S.2d 364 (1941)
(exclusive hotel and apartment zone-aesthetic appeal, tourism); State ex rel. Civello v.
City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 S. 440 (1923) (architectural control-property
values); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955)
(historic district, architectural control-tourism); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate,
333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955) (historic district, architectural control-tourism);
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 198 A.2d 447 (1964)
(outdoor advertising-property values); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d
272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963) (front-yard clothes linesproperty values); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp., v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262,
69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (architectural controls-property
values).
246. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 5, 198 A.2d 447,
449 (1964).
247. See, e.g., Murphy v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944);
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 198 A.2d 447 (1964);
State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217,
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
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tect the right of the traveling public to aesthetic enjoyment and to
preserve the tourist industry as an economic asset of the state, is a
legitimate police power goal. 248 And closely linked with use of the
police power to preserve scenic beauty along highways is the idea that
travelers on a public highway constructed with public funds have a
right to be free from the intrusion of unwelcome advertising that
derives its value to the advertiser entirely from the public investment
in the highway.240
Judicial recognition that the highway advertiser is essentially
"seizing for private benefit an opportunity created for a quite different purpose by the expenditure of public money in the construction
of public ways" 250 and that "the regulation of billboards and their
restriction is not so much a regulation of private property as it is a
regulation of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares" 251
led ultimately, in Kelbro) Inc. v. Myrick,252 to a holding that "the
right of view [from the highway] of the owner or occupant of the
abutting property is limited to such right as is appurtenant to that
property and includes the right to display only goods or advertising
matter pertaining to business conducted thereon." 253 In addition,
the growth in the number of automobiles on the highways and the
increase in normal highway driving speeds has led to the development
of a new public safety rationale for the regulation of outdoor advertising-that regulation of highway advertising may reasonably be
deemed to promote traffic safety, clearly a legitimate objective of
police power regulations.
All of the grounds mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs
have been relied upon by the courts in decisions upholding the regulation of outdoor advertising along the highways. These include a
number of important recent decisions upholding the prohibition of
off-premises advertising along interstate and other limited-access
highways by statutes enacted in the early 1960's to take advantage
2·!8. See, e.g., General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289
Mass. 149, 184-88, 193 N.E. 799, 815-17 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936).
249. See, e.g., General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289
Mass. 149, 167-69, 193 N.E. 799, 808 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936).
250. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub, Works, 289 Mass.
149, 169, 193 N.E. 799, 808 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936).
251. Churchill &: Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Philippines 580, 609 (1915), appeal dismissed,
248 U.S. 591 (1918).
252. 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943).
253. 113 Vt. at 70, 30 A.2d at 530. See Wilson, supra note 94, for an exhaustive
discussion of this "property rights" approach to outdoor advertising regulation. Kelbro
was reaffirmed in Micalite Sign Corp. v. State Highway Dept., 126 Vt. 498, 236 A.2d
680 (1967).
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of the bonus provision of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958.254
These cases have held the goals of legislation very similar to the current compliance laws to be well within the police power, and all of
them have sustained the statutes before the courts against attack on
equal protection and free speech grounds.
In dealing with the police power issue, all of these recent cases
have relied upon both a traffic safety and an "aesthetic values" rationale. In addition, two cases relied in part upon the rationale of
Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, discussed above.255 Since all of these cases
involved statutes that provided for the removal of lawfully erected
nonconforming advertising signs without compensation, they furnish
very strong a fortiori support for use of the police power to prevent
erection of new signs in controlled areas adjacent to interstate and
primary highways.
The distinction between off-premises and on-premises signs was
expressly held to be valid in Opinion of the ]ustices206 and Ghaster
Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 251 against an attack on equal protection
grounds, and has almost uniformly been sustained as reasonable in
other cases.258 The distinction between interstate highways (and, in
some cases, certain other limited-access highways) and other highways
has been upheld in all the recent highway advertising cases.200
Certain equal protection objections can be leveled against compliance laws stimulated by the Highway Beautification Act that could
not be asserted against the earlier state legislation sustained in the
recent cases discussed above. For example, it can be argued that the
compliance laws discriminate arbitrarily between rural and urban
signs-and hence between roadside business advertising and standardized outdoor advertising-because off-premises advertising is allowed
254. Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H.
268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961); New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Ct., Inc.,
10 N.Y,2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v.
Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964); Markham Advertising Co. v. State,
73 Wash. 2d 405, 429 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
255. See text accompanying notes 252-53 supra.
256. 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961).
257. 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
258. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 417
(1964); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362
(1952); Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943). Cf. Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). Contra, Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sar~ota,
122 S.2d 611 (Fla. 1960).
259. Similarly, the distinction between land within 660 feet of interstate highways
(and other controlled highways) and land located farther from such highways has been
sustained either by implication or, in one case, by express language. See Moore v.
Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Ky. 1964).
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only in zoned and unzoned commercial and business areas. 260 It can
also be argued that the regulation of advertising signs in areas adjacent to interstate and federal-aid primary highways but not in areas
adjacent to federal-aid secondary highways or other highways involves
an arbitrary discrimination. I believe it is very unlikely, however,
that state laws enacted to comply with the Highway Beautification
Act will be held invalid on the basis of such equal protection
arguments.
There would appear to be a rational basis for the separate classification261 of zoned and unzoned commercial or industrial areas, on the
one hand, and all other areas, on the other, at least to the extent that
aesthetic considerations are deemed a proper basis for regulation of
highway advertising. It is obvious that, in general, few aesthetic features will be found in zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial
areas, while rural and residential areas are more likely to include
places of scenic beauty and historic interest.262 Similarly, there would
seem to be a rational basis for classifying interstate and federal-aid
primary highways differently than federal-aid secondary highways and
other highways. Interstate highways, as a class, carry more high-speed
traffic than any other class of highways, so the traffic safety rationale
for regulation of outdoor advertising along these highways is particularly persuasive. It also seems clear that the federal-aid primary system, which by statute "shall consist of an adequate system of connected main highways, selected or designated by each State,"263 can
reasonably be given a separate classification on the ground that these
highways are more heavily traveled than federal-aid secondary highways or other state highways. 264
A further equal protection issue may arise because so many of the
state compliance laws do not provide for payment of compensation
upon removal of nonconforming signs lawfully erected in areas adjacent to existing interstate or federal-aid primary highways between
260. Sec, e.g., 1967 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 215-18 (letter from Paul
Spooner, General Counsel, Roadside Business Association, to members of tbe Subcommittee on Roads, April 27, 1967).
261. As tbe United States Supreme Court has held, equal protection of tbe laws
"only requires tbat classification rest on real and not feigned differences, that tbe distinction have some relevance to the purpose for which tbe classification is made, and
that tbe different treatments be not so disparate, relative to tbe difference in classification, as to be wholly arbitrary." Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954).
262. See, e.g., 1967 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 146-47 (colloquy between
Rep. Cramer and Archibald C. Rogers, architect).
263. 23 u.s.c. § 103(b) (1970).
264. For tbe distinction between federal-aid primary and secondary systems, see
23 U.S.C. §§ 103(b)-(c) (1970).
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October 22, 1965, and January 1, 1968. As previously indicated,265 this
omission results from the adoption in state compliance laws of the
language of subsection (g) of title I of the Highway Beautification Act,
but it obviously discriminates against owners of property interests in
those signs and the realty upon which those signs are located. The
only rational basis for this discrimination is the fact that, under subsection (g) of title I, no federal funds are available for compensation
of the holders of such property interests, while the federal government will contribute seventy-five per cent of the compensation required to be paid upon removal of nonconforming signs "(l) lawfully
in existence on the date of enactment of this subsection [October 22,
1965], (2) those lawfully on any highway made a part of the interstate
or primary system on or after the date of enactment of this subsection
and before January 1, 1968, and (3) those lawfully erected on or after
January l, 1968."266 It is doubtful that this fact alone justifies the
states in discriminating between property mvners otherwise similarly
situated. The equal protection issue, however, is unlikely to arise if
payment of compensation is required by federal or state courts on due
process or "taking" grounds.26611
Another possible equal protection problem should be mentioned
here. The state compliance laws enacted in response to title I of the
Highway Beautification Act all provide, broadly, for the prohibition
of future advertising signs by means of the police power, without
compensation to landowners for the loss of their right to erect signs in
the future. However, landowners are to be compensated for the loss
of present rights under existing advertising leases when existing signs
are removed; in many (perhaps most) states, it is not clear whether the
statutory compensation provisions will be construed to require payment of compensation to the landowner for loss of the right to erect
future signs when an existing sign is removed. 267 If the latter construction is adopted, it can be argued that these compliance laws
deny the equal protection of the laws in so far as they provide that
some landowners will be compensated for the loss of a property right,
while other landowners will not.
265. See te.xt accompanying notes 176-77 supra.
266. 23 u.s.c. § 131(g) (1970).
266a. For an indication that uncompensated removal requirements may be consti•
tutionally invalid on such grounds, see Art Neon Co. v. City &: County of Denver, 357
F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1973); State Highway Dept. v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 152 S.E.2d
372 (1966).
267. If state compliance laws are so construed, the problem presented will be similar to the one discussed in D. SUTIE &: R. CUNNINGHAM, SCENIC EASEMENTS: LEGAL,
ADMINISTRATIVE, AND VALUATION PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES 45-46 (Highway Research
Board, NCHRP Report No. 56, 1968).

June 1973]

Billboard Control

1355

Although there seems to be no judicial authority directly in point,
several early zoning cases raised a similar problem. In these cases,
zoning ordinances were attacked as unconstitutionally discriminatory
because they permitted existing nonconforming uses to continue but
prohibited the establishment of the same uses in the future by landowners similarly situated. As early as 1925, however, a California decision, affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, upheld a zoning
ordinance that permitted existing uses to continue although they did
not conform to the use restrictions of the district in which they were
located.268 The court said that the ordinance was not invalid because
it was not retroactive and permitted the continuance of existing nonconforming uses. In 1927, the Tennessee Supreme Court also held
that zoning ordinance provisions allowing continuance of existing
nonconforming uses did not discriminate unfairly in favor of the nonconforming user. 269 Within the next decade, the courts of eight states
reached the same conclusion.270 The courts have generally said that
the distinction between existing and future uses of land is not arbitrary or unreasonable, has a rational basis,271 and affects in a similar
manner all persons similarly situated.272 In short, it is reasonable to
place in separate classes those landowners with existing nonconforming uses on their land and those without such uses. In addition, the
courts have said that a municipality can protect existing uses so that
the zoning ordinance is not unnecessarily harsh and burdensome273
and that it "would seem almost, if not quite, necessary" to include in
zoning ordinances provisions allowing continuance of nonconforming
uses. 274
These early zoning cases would seem, at least by analogy, to pro268. Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388 (1925), a/fd., 274 U.S.
325 (1927).
269. Spencer-Sturla Co. v. City of Memphis, 155 Tenn. '70, 290 S.W. 608 (1927).
270. Marquis v. City of Waterloo, 210 Iowa 439, 228 N.W. 870 (1930); City of
Norton v. Hutson, 142 Kan. 305, 46 P .2d 630 (1935); Sampere v. City of New Orleans,
166 La. '776, 117 S. 827 (1928), affd. per curiam, 279 U.S. 812 (1929); Stone v. Cray, 89
N.H. 483, 200 A. 517 (1938); City of Elizabeth City v. Aydlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E.
78 (1931); Baxley v. City of Frederick, 133 Okla. 84, 271 P. 257 (1928); Huebner v.
Philadelphia Sav. Fund Socy., 127 Pa. Super. 28, 192 A. 139 (1937); Lombardo v. City of
Dallas, 47 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), a/fd., 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475 (1934).
271. See, e.g., Vendley v. City of Berkeley, 21 Ill. 2d 563, 566, 173 N.E.2d 506, 508
(1961); Kinney v. Sutton, 230 N.C. 404, 411, 53 S.E.2d 306, 310 (1949).
272. Sampere v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 776, 780, 117 S. 827, 828 (1928), affd.
per curiam, 279 U.S. 812 (1928).
273. State ex rel. Manhein v. Harrison, 164 La. 564, 570, 114 S. 159, 161 (1927).
274. Momeier v. John McAiister, Inc., 203 S.C. 353, 372, 27 S.E.2d 504, 511 (1943).
A number of cases hold that attempts to eliminate nonconforming uses by means of
the police power are unconstitutional. E.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304,
295 P. 14 (19!10).
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vide adequate authority to sustain the different treatment under state
compliance laws of those landowners who have advertising signs on
their land under existing leases and those who do not. Moreover,
where advertising signs were erected before the compliance law became effective, the value of the landowner's right to use his land for
outdoor advertising has been factually demonstrated; where advertising signs have not been erected by that date, the value of his right
has not been factually demonstrated. This difference alone seems
sufficient to justify a different classification for land on which lawful
advertising signs have already been erected when the compliance law
becomes effective.275

2. Control by Means of the Spending Power
and the Eminent Domain Power
One question that immediately comes to mind is whether acquisition of nonconforming highway advertising signs and the associated
property rights can be deemed to promote a public purpose and to
result in a public use of the property acquired. This problem is important because (I) expenditure of public funds for other than public
purposes is generally prohibited by state constitutions,276 (2) almost
all state constitutions allow the taking of private property by eminent
domain only for public use,277 and (3) a statute authorizing the taking
275. Cf. D. SUTIE &: R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 267, at 46.
276. Some state constitutions expressly prohibit expenditures of public funds or
levying taxes for other than public purposes. See AI.As. CoNST. art. IX, § 6; HAWAII
CONST. art. VI, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § l; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8; Mo. CONST. art. X,
§ 3; MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 11; TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; WASH, CONST. art. VII,
§ 1. Other state constitutions prohibit either a grant of public money or a loan of
the state's credit to private individuals, associations, or corporations. See .ARIZ. CONST.
art. 9, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 31; CoLO. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; Mo. CoNST. art. III,
§ 38(a); NEV. CONST. art. 8, § 9 (purchase of stock of corporations, companies, associations prohibited); N.J. CoNST. art. VIII, § III, 11 3; N.M. CoNsr. art. IX, § 14; N.Y.
CONST. art. VII, § 8; OKLA. CoNST. art. X, § 15. And many state constitutions simply
prohibit the giving o_r lending of the state's credit to private individuals, associations,
or corporations. See Ai.A. CONST. art. 4, § 93; ARK. CoNsr. art. 16, § l; FLA. CONST.
art. 7, § 10; GA. CONST. art. VII, § III, 11 IV; IDAHO CoNsr. art. VIII, § 2; IOWA CONST.
art. VII, § l; KY. CONST. § 177; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 14 (except for insuring industrial
development mortgage loans); MD. CONST. art. III, § 34; MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 10; MISS.
CoNST. art. 14, § 258; N.J. CONST. art. VIII,§ 2, 11 l; Omo CoNsr. art. VII,§ 4; PA. CONST.
art. VIII, § 8; s.c. CONST. art. X, § 6; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 31; TEX. CONST. art. Ill,
§ 50; UTAH CoNST. art. 6, § 31; VA. CONST. art. X, § 10 (except insuring industrial development loans); WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6; WIS. CONST.
art. VIII, § 3; WYO. CoNST. art. XVI, § 6. Provisions of this third type, merely prohibiting the giving or lending of the state's credit, have generally been construed to
prohibit the expenditure of public funds for any nonpublic purpose.
277. The federal constitution and all but three of the state constitutions contain
provisions that have been construed to protect the owner of private property from an
exercise of the power of eminent domain for purposes that do not involve a public
use. In some cases the state constitutions expressly forbid the taking of private prop-
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of private property for other than public use will violate the fourteenth amendment's prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law.278
There would appear to be at least two possible lines of attack on
the public use issue. First, the courts can rely on cases like Berman v.
Parker,219 which hold, in substance, that public use means simply
public purpose or public benefit. This is essentially what the state
courts have done in the many cases challenging state urban renewal
enabling acts. 280 In at least twenty-nine states, the courts, without the
aid of special constitutional provisions, have sustained urban renewal
statutes that authorize the use of eminent domain to acquire land
and the resale of the land to private agencies for redevelopment in
accordance with a publicly approved plan and subject to land-use
restrictions designed to assure continued compliance with that
plan.281 The courts of these states have, in effect, though not always
in express terms, equated public use with substantial public purpose. Although most of the cases emphasize the public purpose
and public use (the terms are used interchangeably) involved in the
clearance of slum and blighted areas, 282 some cases also recognize that
erty for private uses. In a majority of cases the negative implication of the conventional
condemnation clause-that private property shall not be taken for public use without
payment of just compensation-is used to protect the property owner from a taking
for private use. Even in the three states that have no express constitutional provision
as to eminent domain, it has been held that other constitutional provisions preclude
the taking of private property for private use or without payment of just compensation. Moreover, most state constitutions contain a clause prohibiting the taking of
property without due process of law, or equivalent provisions; in some instances the
state courts have relied on these clauses in holding a taking for private use unconstitutional, either because the state constitution did not contain the usual eminent domain clause or because the court was not satisfied with the implied prohibition
contained in that clause. For a more extended discussion with citation of authorities,
see 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 106, § 7.1.
278. Hairston v. Danville &: W. Ry., 208 U.S. 598 (1908); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S.
361 (1905). For discussion, see 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 106, § 4.7.
279. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
280. See 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 106, § 7.51561 n.l, at 188-203, citing cases from
36 states upholding urban renewal enabling acts. For a similar list of cases from 31
jurisdictions upholding such acts, with a useful classification of the cases, see the appendix to Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 393-95, 378 P.2d 464, 475-77 (1963).
281. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mis~issippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. The
only state that is still clearly contra is South Carolina. See 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note
106, § 7.51561 n.1, at 188-203.
282. See, e.g., Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 128-29, 59 N.E.2d 18, 25 (1945).
All the state court decisions on the constitutionality of urban renewal acts authorizing the exercise of the eminent domain power have been significantly influenced
by Lhe United States Supreme Court's opinion in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954),
discussed in tc.xt accompanying note 279 supra.
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resale of urban renewal project land subject to restrictions that limit
its future use to publicly authorized purposes creates a kind of continuing public use of the land.283 The parallel with a highway advertising control program is clear, since the essence of such a program is
restriction of the use of privately owned land to achieve a purpose
declared by the legislature to be a public purpose. Indeed, the urban
renewal cases actually go further than is necessary to sustain a highway advertising control program, since the latter does not involve the
resale of land for what is clearly private use in the ordinary sense of
the term.
Second, since the purpose of the highway advertising control program is, in part at least, identical to the purpose of the scenic easement acquisition program, and the restrictions against advertising
use to be imposed under the advertising control program are essentially similar to scenic easements (though more limited in scope),
state courts could simply follow the holding in Kamrowski v. State281
that "[t]he enjoyment of the scenic beauty by the public which passes
along the highway" is "a direct use by the public of the rights in land
which have been taken in the form of a scenic easement." 285
Assuming that the issue of public use is resolved on the Berman
theory, the question of public purpose or public benefit still remains.
It seems clear that acquisition of highway advertising signs and the
associated rights of sign owners and landowners will be held to be for
a public purpose and to produce a public benefit in any state where
the courts have accepted aesthetic zoning as a valid exercise of the
police power, since the cases supporting aesthetic zoning are based on
judicial recognition of the fact that the preservation of aesthetic
values is an appropriate goal of governmental action.286 And, if
police-power regulation, without compensation, is an appropriate
means of achieving this governmental objective, then a fortiori the
expenditure of public funds and the use of the eminent domain
power are appropriate where nonconforming highway signs and the
associated property rights must be acquired by the state. Indeed, the
acquisition of such signs and the associated rights is likely to be held
to involve a public purpose and to produce a public benefit in many
states where aesthetic zoning has not yet been fully accepted, since
283. See, e.g., Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 143•44, 104 A.2d
365, 369-70 (1954).
284. 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
285. 31 Wis. 2d at 265, 142 N.W.2d at 797.
286. See· text accompanying notes 244-46 supra.
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there are many cases in these states directly upholding the control of
highway advertising under the police power.287 Moreover, as the
states shift from the uncompensated control of land use under the
police power to acquisition of nonconforming signs and related
property rights by means of eminent domain, with payment of just
compensation, it becomes much less necessary for courts to oversee
the legislative or administrative definition of "beauty" or "scenic"
-a problem of definition that underlies much of the judicial reluctance to accept aesthetic zoning as a valid exercise of the police
power.288 In any case, the traffic safety rationale of highway advertising control is almost certainly adequate to satisfy the public purpose
requirement.
In light of the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that in all, or
almost all, states the acquisition of nonconforming highway signs and
the associated property rights of both the sign owners and the landowners pursuant to state advertising control laws will be held (if challenged in the courts) to involve both a public use and a public purpose sufficient to justify the expenditure of public funds and the use
of the power of eminent domain.
3. State Contitutional "Antidiversion"
Provisions

Assuming that the acquisition of nonconforming highway signs
and the associated property rights by means of eminent domain and
the use of public funds to pay just compensation therefor are constitutionally justifiable under the public use and public purpose
tests, there remains in many states the question whether it is lawful
for a state highway agency to use dedicated highway funds to pay the
state's twenty-five per cent share of the just compensation required by
title I of the Highway Beautification Act.
Some twenty-eight states have constitutional provisions that earmark certain state revenues-typically the motor fuel excise taxes
and the vehicle registration fees-for specified highway purposes.283
These provisions are generally known as "antidiversion amendments"
and have prevented highway user taxes from being appropriated for
287. See text accompanying notes 235-42, 248-55 supra.
288. "Whatever may be the law with respect to zoning restrictions based upon
aesthetic considerations, a stronger argument can be made in support of the power
to take property, in return for just compensation, in order to fulfill aesthetic concepts,
than for the imposition of police power restrictions for such purposes." Kamrowski v.
State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 265-66, 142 N.W.2d 793, 797 (1966).
289. The provisions are as follows: ALA. CoNsr. amend. 93; ARiz. CoNsr. art. 9,
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the support of governmental programs that have nothing to do with
highways and thus confer no benefit on the highway user qua highway user. Although the forces that were originally mobilized in the
1920's to promote these amendments were, and still are, energetic in
their efforts, they were not able to secure uniformity of language in
the amendments that were adopted. As a result, each state legislature
that faces the problem of squaring its highway advertising control
program with its state constitution must look carefully to the wording
of the antidiversion amendment in its own constitution.
All the amendments, naturally, are chiefly concerned with directing highway user funds into road construction and maintenance. The
most liberal simply specify "highway purposes," 290 "highway purposes
as defined by Iaw," 291 or the creation of a special highway fund292 or
add "other statutory highway purposes" to the list of specified highway purposes.293 In these states it seems clear that the legislature, by
designating the acquisition of nonconforming signs and associated
property rights as a "highway purpose," can make dedicated highway
funds available for acquisition of signs and associated rights if it
wishes. Many of the current highway advertising control laws contain
such a designation.
A few states have other general language in their antidiversion
amendments that could be interpreted to permit the use of highway
user funds for billboard acquisition. For example, the California and
Utah provisions speak of "construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of highways." 294 Georgia's provision refers to "all activ§ 14; CAL. CoNST, art. 26; CoLO. CoNST. art. X, § 18; GA. CONST, art. VII, § IX, 1 IV(b);
IDAHO CoNST. art. VII, § 17; IOWA CONST. art. VII, § 8; KAN. CONST. art. 11, § IO; KY.
CONST. § 230; LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 22-23; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 19; MASS. CONST. amend.
LXXIII; MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 9; MINN. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 9, 10; Mo. CoNST, art.
IV, § 30(b); MONT. CONST. art. XII, § l(b); NEV. CONST. art. 9, § 5; N.H. CONST. pt. II,
art. 6-a; N.D. CONST. amend. 56; OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 5a; ORE. CONST, art. IX, § S;
PA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 11; S.D. CoNsr. art. XI, § 8; TEX. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 7-a; UTAH
CoNsr. art. 13, § 13; WASH. CoNsr. art. II,§ 40; w. VA. CONST. art. VI,§ 52; WYO. CONST.
art. XV, § 16.
290. KAN. CoNsr. art. 11, § 10.
291. MrcH. CONST. art. IX, § 9.
292. LA. CoNsr. art. VI, § 23.
293. Omo CoNST. art. XII, § 5(a).
294. CAL. CONST. art. 26; UTAH CONST. art. 13, § 13. (Emphasis added.) The Mis•
souri provision similarly authorizes use of dedicated highway funds to complete, widen
or improve the state highway system, and also for "such other purposes and contingencies relating ••• to the construction and maintenance of such highways ••• as the
commission may deem necessary and proper." Mo. CoNST. art. IV, § 30(b) (emphasis
added).
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ities incident to providing and maintaining an adequate system of
public highways." 295 And Washington's provision speaks of "construction, reconstruction, repair and betterment of public highways." 296
In many states, the antidiversion amendments simply prescribe in
substance that the "construction, reconstruction, maintenance and
repair" of highways are the only permissible uses of highway user
funds. 207 Even under such amendments, however, it would seem
that highway user funds could be properly expended for acquisition
of nonconforming highway signs and the associated rights if the enabling legislation expressly states that such acquisition may be deemed
to constitute "a part of the establishment, construction, or reconstruction of State highways on the Federal-aid Highway System"298 or that
"[!]and, or any interest therein, acquired under ... this act is hereby
declared to be part of the adjacent or nearest highway.'' 299
Up until the late 1950's there was practically no case law interpreting the antidiversion amendments. Following the authorization
by Congress in 1956300 of the use of federal-aid highway funds to reimburse the states for ninety per cent of the cost of relocating utility
facilities away from highway rights-of-way, however, there was a rash
of state legislation designed to liberalize existing state limitations on
payments of this type. In those states with constitutional antidiversion
provisions where the constitutionality of making utility relocation
payments from the highway trust funds has been litigated, the decisions are divided, but a majority has sustained the legislation and has
expressly held that such payments do not violate the constitutional
provisions.301
Even more significant is the decision in Newman v. Hjelle, 802 sustaining the use of highway trust funds to purchase highway advertis295. GA. CoNST, art. VII, § IX, ,r IV(b).
296. WASH. CONST. art. II,§ 40 (emphasis added).
297. This is the case in Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.
298. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-413.I (Supp. 1966).
299. UTAH CODE ANN, § 27-12-109.3 (Supp. 1967).
300. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, § 111, 70 Stat. 383 (codified
at 23 U.S.C. § 123 (1970)).
301. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 253 Minn. 164, 91 N.W.2d 642 (1958); Jones
v. Burns, 138 Mont. 268, 357 P.2d 22 (1960); Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 527, 132
A.2d 613 (1957); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245 (N.D. 1960); State
v. City of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 737 (1960).
302, 133 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. 1965).
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ing rights in connection with the bonus provisions of the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1958. The diversion issue was squarely raised in Newman by the plaintiff's attempt to enjoin the state's use of revenue from
motor fuel taxes and vehicle license and registration fees for the purchase of advertising rights. The opinion of the court carefully traced
the history of the North Dakota antidiversion amendment and concluded by saying:
It is clear the purpose of the amendment was to prevent any use
of the earmarked revenues for anything but highway purposes and
not to restrict the terms of the amendment by a narrow construction
of the purpose for which the revenue may be used within the area
designated.
In view of this history and statutes in effect at the time the constitutional amendment was voted upon, it is clear that the people
intended .•. to make the scope broad enough to include such matters
as were considered within the area of the powers of the State Highway
Department, as those powers may exist in relation to public highways.
We find this included the right to control advertising signs, billboards,
and other signs erected on the right of way, as well as on lands abutting thereon, if such control was provided by law. 3 03
303. 133 N.W.2d at 557-58. In 1963, the Attorneys General of North and South Dakota
were asked to render opinions on the constitutionality of proposals that would have authorized the state highway departments to enter into agreements with the Secretary of
Commerce under the 1958 federal-aid legislation providing for billboard control along
the interstate system.
South Dakota's Attorney General was of the opinion that use of dedicated highway
funds to purchase outdoor advertising rights would violate the state constitutional
provision that requires that such funds be spent "e.xclusively for the maintenance, construction and supervision" of highways and bridges. In passing, he distinguished the
use of highway funds to pay for the relocation of utilities from the highway right-of-way
by noting that no vested property rights were disturbed by relocation and that it was
merely incident to actual highway contsruction. See 1963-64 S.D. ATrY. GEN, REP. 34.
Shortly after the South Dakota opinion was issued, the Attorney General of North
Dakota issued his opinion. He noted that North Dakota's constitution limits the use of
dedicated highway funds to "construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of
public highways"-a limitation that he felt was even tighter than South Dakota's, which
also mentions "supervision." He also noted North Dakota's legislation providing for
payment of utility relocation costs and cited the North Dakota court's approval of that
law on the ground that "'construction' embraces everything appropriately connected
with and necessarily incidental to the complete accomplishment of the general purpose
for which the fund exists." However, the Attorney General found no authority for regarding the acquisition of outdoor advertising rights, either in the form of additional
right-of-way or rights in land adjacent to the right-of-way, to be part of highway "construction." Instead, he viewed control of roadside advertising as an independent project
and expressed "serious doubts" that dedicated highway funds could lawfully be spent
for this purpose. See 1962-64 N.D. Am. GEN. REP. 148.
Two years later, however, the Attorney General of North Dakota was compelled to
argue in support of the state's program of billboard control through purchase of advertising rights and, in Newman v. Hjelle, succeeded in convincing the court that this practice should be sustained.
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Although the case law dealing with the antidiversion amendments
is certainly not conclusive, on the whole it gives reason to believe that
these amendments will generally not be construed so narrowly as to
preclude the use of dedicated highway funds for the acquisition of
nonconforming highway signs and the associated property rights of
sign owners and landowners.
Ill.

CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION

Although the advertising control provisions of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 have been the subject of unremitting controversy from the date of enactment until the present time, only three
substantive amendments to title I have been adopted in the intervening years. These are the amendments to subsections (d) 304 and
(j) 305 and the addition of a new subsection (n),306 all of which were
adopted in 1968.807
In 1969, several abortive attempts were made to amend title I
further. A Senate bi11308 would have authorized the Secretary to enter
into agreements with one or more states for the purpose of carrying
out pilot programs to determine the best means of accomplishing the
objectives of title I and would have appropriated fifteen million dollars for such programs. The legislative history of the bill clearly indicates that it was primarily designed to allow Utah to proceed with
removal of nonconforming billboards pursuant to the "Snarr plan."809
The 1969 House bill310 would have (1) changed the deadline for compliance with subsection (b) of title I from January 1, 1968, to January
1, 1971,311 (2) appropriated a mere 1.5 million dollars for highway
304. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
305. See note 16 supra.
306. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
307. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, §§ 6(a)-(b),(d), 82 Stat. 817.
308. S. 1442, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
309. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 51-60 (testimony of Douglas T.
Snarr); 1969 House Hearings, supra note 43, at 185-90. See also 1969 Senate Hearings,
supra, at 4-51 (testimony and statements of Senator Frank E. Moss, Henry C. Helland,
Larry Wimmer, and F. John Francis); 1969 House Hearings, supra, at 161-84 (testimony
and statements of Henry C. Helland, Merrill Bateman, and F. John Francis).
In substance, the "Snarr plan" envisaged thl!t the state highway agencies would buy,
and each advertising company would sell, all nonconforming signs within a given state
pursuant to a single contract negotiated by the state and the company instead of requiring the state agency to buy or condemn nonconforming signs one at a time. For a
more detailed description, see R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 42, at 62.
310. H.R. 14741, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
311. H.R. 14741, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1969).
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beautification programs in fiscal 1971,312 and (3) required the Secretary, in cooperation with the state highway departments, to "make a
full and complete investigation and study of how such programs
should be carried out to effectively provide the desired public and
private benefits and submit to Congress a report based on such investigation and study, including his recommendations, not later than
April 15, 1970."313
Neither bill became law, but the Department of Transportation
nevertheless conducted a new study of the problems arising under
title I and issued a report in June 1970.314 A bill encompassing its
recommendations was introduced in the Senate on July 1, 1970,m
and another bill with the same provisions ~s the abortive 1969 Senate
bill was introduced on August 18, 1970.316 However, neither of these
was enacted by Congress. Ultimately, Congress included in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970317 a provision creating an eleven-member Commission on Highway Beautification,318 to be composed of two
majority and two minority members from each of the two congressional Public Works Committees and three members to be appointed
by the President "from among persons who are not officers or employees of the United States." 319
Although the authorizing legislation provided that the Commission should make a final report not later than one year after it was
312. H.R. 14741, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1969).
313. H.R. 14741, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1969).
314. HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 9lsr. CONG., 2D SESS., R.EsrUDY OF THE HIGHWAY
BEAUTIFICATION PROGRAM (Comm. Print 1970).
315. S. 4055, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 108 (1970).
316. S. 4260, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 113 (1970).
317. Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1713 (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
318. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 123, 84 Stat. 1727.
The Commission of Highway Beautification is charged to
(1) study existing statutes and regulations governing the control of outdoor advertising and junkyards in areas adjacent to the Federal-aid highway system; (2) review
the policies and practices of the Federal and State agencies charged with administrative jurisdiction over such highways insofar as such policies and practices relate
to governing the control of outdoor advertising and junkyards; (3) compile data
necessary to understand and determine the requirements for such control which
may now exist or are likely to exist within the foreseeable future; (4) study problems relating to the control of on-premise outdoor advertising signs, promotional
signs, directional signs, and signs providing information that i$ essential to the
motoring public; (5) study methods of financing and possible sources of Federal
funds, including use of the Highway Trust Fund, to carry out a highway beautification program; and (6) recommend such modifications or additions to existing laws,
regulations, policies, practices, and demonstration programs as will, in the judgment
of the Commission, achieve a workable and effective highway beautification program
and best serve the public interest.
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-605, § 123(h), 84 Stat. 1727.
319. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 123(b), 84 Stat. 1727.
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funded 320 (August 1971), for various reasons the Commission did not
become fully operational until December 1971.821 The Commission
then held public hearings throughout the country and amassed a considerable amount of data and information about highway beautification. In the latter part of 1972, it prepared an interim report recommending certain statutory amendments and requesting an extension
of time to enable it to complete a number of investigations relating,
inter alia, to (1) the reconsideration of agreements where there is dissatisfaction with terms on such matters as definition of unzoned commercial areas, interchanges, and spacing; (2) examination of methods
of getting information to motorists efficiently and in a manner consistent with highway beautification, including implementation of pilot
projects on official information centers and radio transmissions; (3)
methods for calculating compensation for sign removals and the effect
of such compensation on state and local sign control programs; (4) the
clarification of the effective date of controls imposed by the Highway
Beautification Act of 1965; (5) the clarification, and possible modification, of the relationship of controls under the 1958 Bonus Act to
controls under the 1965 Highway Beautification Act; (6) revisions in
the Secretary of Transportation's authority to impose a ten per cent
penalty for failure to comply with federal requirements for highway
beautification; (7) the clarification of the legality of federal participation in certain payments made under laws covering outdoor advertising; (8) modifications in state-local relationships in sign control programs; (9) the feasibility of Highway Corridor Boards in sign control
programs, zoning, and other land use planning; (10) the relationship
of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act to compensation paid under a state's laws enacted to comply with the Highway Beautification
Act; (11) the development of scenic routes; and (12) relative priorities
in the highway beautification program.822
A provision for the extension of the date for completion of the
Commission's work to December 31, 1973, was embodied in both the
Senate and House versions of the ill-fated Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1972.828 However, in the current session of the Congress, the issue
320. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91--605, § 123(i), 84 Stat. 1727.
321. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 13.
322. The interim report has not been published, but copies may be obtained from
the Commission on Highway Beautification, 1121 Vermont Ave., N.W., Washington,
D.C.20005.
323. S. 3939, § 146(a), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in 118 CoNG. R.Ec. S15336
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 133(a), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in
118 CoNG, R.Ec. H9300 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972).
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of the continuation of the Commission was separated from other
highway legislation, and a joint resolution was passed extending the
Commission's life until December 31, 1973.324
The unenacted Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972 also contained
several proposed amendments to title I of the Highway Beautification
Act of 1965. Both the Senate and House versions of the Act would
have amended subsection (m) of title I to authorize the expenditure
of 50 million dollars in each of the fiscal years 1974 and 1975 for the
removal of nonconforming advertising signs,325 and both versions
would have required the states to purchase all nonconforming signs
voluntarily offered by the owner for removal if federal funds were
available.326 Both versions would have amended subsection (b) to extend highway advertising controls beyond the present 660 feet from
the edge of the right-of-way to cover all signs visible from and erected
with the purpose of being read from the main traveled way of the
interstate or federal-aid primary system327 and would have eliminated
any reference in subsection (d) to the 660 feet setback requirement.828
Both the Senate and House versions of the 1972 Act would also
have amended (I) subsection (e) so as to provide simply that "[a]ny
nonconforming sign under State law enacted to comply with this. section shall be removed no later than the end of the fifth year after it
324. Pub. L. No. 93-6, 87 Stat. 6.
325. S. 3939, § 122(g), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in ll8 CONG. R.Ec. Sl5332
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(g), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in ll8
CoNG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972).
326. S. 3939, § 122(h), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in ll8 CONG. R.Ec. Sl5332
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(h), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in IIS
CONG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972).
327. The Senate bill would have required imposition of the ten per cent penalty
with respect to
Federal-aid highway funds apportioned on or after January l, 1973, or after the expiration of the next regular session of the State legislature, whichever is later, to
any State which the Secretary [of Transportation] determines has not made provision for effective control of the erection and maintenance along the Interstate System and the primary system of those additional outdoor advertising signs ••• which
are more than six hundred and sixty feet off the nearest edge of the right of way,
visible from the main traveled way of the system, and erected with the purpose of
their message being read from such main traveled way •.• until such time as such
State shall provide for such effective control.
S. 3939, § 122(a), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in ll8 CoNG. R.Ec. Sl5331-32 (daily
ed. Sept. 19, 1972).
The House bill would have imposed the ten per cent penalty only beginning with
"Federal-aid highway funds apportioned on or after January 1, 1974, or after the expiration of the next regular session of the State legislature ••••" H.R. 16656, § 120(a),
passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in 118 CoNG. R.Ec. H9297 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972).
328. S. 3939, § 122(c), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in ll8 CoNG. R.Ec. Sl5332
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(c), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in II8
CONG. R.Ec. H9297-98 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972).
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becomes nonconforming, except as determined by the Secretary;" 329
(2) subsection (£) by giving the Secretary the power to include areas
"within the rights-of-way of the primary system" as areas "in which
signs •.. giving- specific information in the interest of the traveling
public may be erected and maintained;"380 (3) subsection (g) to read,
"[j]ust compensation shall be paid upon the removal of any outdoor
advertising sign ... lawfully erected under State law;" 331 and would
have added a new subsection (o):
No directional sign ... lawfully in existence on June I, 1972, giving
specific information in the interest of the traveling public shall be
required to be removed until December 31, 1973, or until a State in
which the sign ... is located certifies that the directional information
about the service or activity advertised on such sign ... may reasonably be available to motorists by some other method or methods,
whichever shall occur first.ss2
In the current session of Congress, the federal-aid highway bill
originally passed by the Senate333 contained amendments to title I
of the Highway Beautification Act similar to those in the abortive
1972 Act, and other amendments were proposed by the House committee.338a But the bill that emerged from the conference committee
and was finally enacted into law contains no provisions relating to
control of outdoor advertising, and it provides no new funding for
fiscal years 1974-76.833b
329. S. 3939, § 122(d), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in 118 CoNG. R.Ec. Sl5332
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(d), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in 118
CoNG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972).
330. S. 3939, § 122(e), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in 118 CONG. R.Ec. Sl5332
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972): H.R. 16656, § 120(e), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in 118
CoNG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972). The House also would have prevented erection
of such signs along the interstate and primary systems in urban or suburban areas in
lieu of signs permitted by subsection (d) and where adequate information is provided
by signs permitted by subsection (c).
331. S. 3939, § 122(f), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in 118 CONG. R.Ec. Sl5332
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(f), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in 118
CoNG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972).
332. S. 3939, § 122(h), passed by the Senate, Sept. 19, 1972, in 118 CONG. R.Ec. Sl5332
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972); H.R. 16656, § 120(h), passed by the House, Oct. 6, 1972, in 118
CONG. R.Ec. H9298 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972).
333. S. 502, § 124, passed by the Senate, March 15, 1973, in 119 CONG. R.Ec. S4985
(daily ed. March 15, 1973).
333a. S. 502, § 120, reported by the House Comm. on Public Works, April 10, 1973.
See H.R. REP. No. 93-118, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 78-81 (1973).
333b. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat. 250. However,
the conference report stressed: "The deletion of these provisions should not be construed as discontinuing the programs or affecting the existing law. The present programs remain in effect. It is the expectation of the conferees that the Congress will
consider additional authorizations and possible modifications in separate legislation."
H.R. REP. No. 93-410, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1973).
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Is title I of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, as some have
declared, a "case study in legislative frustration"? 334 With the benefit
of hindsight, it is easy to say that our national policy with regard to
highway advertising along the interstate system would have been better served by a ban on advertising visible from the highways right
from the start of the interstate construction program in the midl 950's. Such a ban-with perhaps an exception for commercially or
industrially zoned areas and areas actually developed for commercial
or industrial use, as under the 1965 Act-would certainly have been
justifiable in view of the facts that the federal government was to supply ninety per cent of the funding for the interstate system and that
any advertising value attached to adjacent land would be entirely a
result of the construction of the system with funds contributed by
federal and state taxpayers. No landowner along a new interstate
highway could reasonably claim any vested right to profit from the
construction of the highway by using or leasing his land for advertising purposes, nor could any outdoor advertising company claim a
vested right to profit from the construction of the highway by leasing
adjacent land for advertising displays.
Had the Congress originally decided to condition federal funding
of the interstate system upon a state's total prohibition of advertising
within view of the interstate highways (with the possible exceptions of
the areas described above), there can be little doubt that construction
of the system would have gone forward on schedule and the problem
of eliminating lawfully erected but nonconforming signs along the
interstate system-a problem that has seriously obstructed attempts
to implement the Highway Beautification Act of 1965-would have
been largely avoided. Thus, the congressional decision in 1958 to use
the bonus approach to billboard control335 seems, in retrospect, to
have been a serious mistake. Perhaps a larger bonus would have been
more effective,336 but prior to the passage of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 only twenty-five states had enacted billboard control
legislation to qualify for the 1958 Act bonus,337 and some of these did
not enact implementing legislation until 1965.338 Consequently, a
334. See Lamm &: Yasinow, supra note 48.
335. See note 7 supra.
. 336. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, § 12, 72 Stat. 96,
provided a bonus of only one half of one per cent for states that complied with the advertising control provisions of the Act.
337. Lamm &: Yasinow, supra note 48, at 441.
338. E.g., Ch. 828, [1965] Minn. Laws 1524, as amended, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 173.
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large number of billboards were in place along the interstate system
by 1965, when the Highway Beautification Act came before the Congress, and Congress then had to deal with the problem of eliminating
existing billboards as well as the problem of preventing the future
erection of billboards along interstate highways. Faced with these
problems, it was probably inevitable that Congress would adopt the
penalty approach, rather than the bonus approach, in the Act of 1965.
Having settled on the penalty approach, should not Congress have
adhered to the original proposal made by the 1965 Act's sponsors to
allow the several states, to the extent constitutionally permissible, to
remove existing billboards by the use of their police power, without
payment of compensation? It seems fairly clear that the United States
Constitution does not require payment of compensation, either to the
owner of the sign or to the owner of the land on which the sign is
located, upon removal of a nonconforming sign. 339 Moreover, there
is impressive authority in several states that state constitutional provisions do not require payment of compensation upon the removal
of such signs.340 Indeed, twenty-three of the twenty-five states that
adopted legislation to qualify for the bonus under the Federal Highway Act of 1958 chose to use the police power to eliminate existing
nonconforming signs without payment of compensation.341 Arguably,
therefore, Congress, in enacting the Highway Beautification Act of
1965, should have allowed these twenty-three states, and any other
01-.27 (Supp. 1973); ch. 260, [1965] Iowa Acts 408, as amended,
§§ 306B.l-.8 (Supp. 1972).

IOWA

CoDE ANN.

339. See, e.g., St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411-12 (1915); Rcinman v. City of Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1915). See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). But see
Art Neon Co. v. City &: County of Denver, 357 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1973).
340. Moore v. Ward, 377 S."W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H.
268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961); New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Ct., Inc.,
10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Ghastcr Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash.
2d 405,439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969); Kclbro, Inc. v. Myrick,
113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943). It is obvious that, if the courts should generally accept
the Kelbro rationale, holding that there is no property right in the use of land for offpremises advertising, no compensation would be constitutionally required when such
advertising is removed. There arc cases upholding zoning ordinance provisions that require the discontinuance of nonconforming uses after an amortization period in the following states: California, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, and 'Washington; unfavorable decisions in zoning cases have been
handed down in Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, South Carolina, and
Texas. See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 42,- at 42-43 nn.349-68 and accompanying text.
Elimination of nonconforming highway advertising signs without payment of compensation was held unconstitutional in State Highway Dept. v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 152
S.E.2d 372 (1966).
341. Lamm &: Yasinow, supra note 48, at 441 n.23.
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states that wished to follow their lead, to rely upon the police power,
while providing financial assistance for those states where judicial interpretation of state constitutional provisions might require the payment of just compensation upon the removal of nonconforming signs.
This approach was contemplated in the 1965 Act as originally introduced.
Despite the apparent advantages of this approach, Congress' decision to require payment of compensation upon the removal of nonconforming billboards is both understandable and defensible. In the
first place, the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 was intended to
control billboards along the federal-aid primary highways, as well as
along the interstate system. The highway advertising industry, and
the roadside businesses dependent on highway advertising, had grown
up with the primary system over a period of forty to fifty years, and
there was a strong feeling in the Congress that advertising rights along
these highways were vested property rights, which ought not be
destroyed without payment of just compensation.842 This feeling was
frequently expressed in committee hearings and in the floor debates
with respect to existing signs along both systems,843 but the feeling
seems to have been stronger with respect to the primary system. And
this feeling has a strong jurisprudential basis in the fundamental considerations of fairness so well analyzed by Professor Michelman in his
recent article on the ethical foundations of just compensation law.844
It would have been possible, of course, to treat nonconforming
billboards along the interstate system differently from those along the
primary system, authorizing billboard removal along the interstate
system by means of the police power, without compensation, while
requiring payment of compensation for removal of billboards along
the primary system. But this would certainly have raised a serious
equal protection problem.
All things considered, the basic pattern of title I of the Highway Beautification Act, as finally enacted, may well be the best
that could be devised, given the failure of the Congress to prohibit
the erection of billboards along the new interstate system from the
time of its inception in the mid-1950's and the strong desire of the
Johnson Administration to make billboard controls along the interstate system more effective and to extend such controls to the federal342. 1965 SENATE R.El'ORT, supra note 20, at 15 (individual views of Sen. Cooper).
343. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
344. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
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aid primary system. In any case, the billboard control program now
appears, after a seven-year delay, to be a going concern, with all ,but
one of the states (according to the Secretary of Transportation) now
fully in compliance with title I, 345 substantial federal funding available, 846 and many states actively engaged in removing nonconforming
billboards as contemplated by the 1965 Act. The Federal Highway
Administration expects the removal process to be completed by the
end of 1978 if federal funding continues at the current level, with a
total cost of 250 to 300 million dollars.847
It must be conceded, however, that title I of the Highway Beautification Act is one of the worst-drafted pieces of legislation ever to
emerge from the Congress. Most of its defects have been discussed in
detail earlier in this Article.848 One major defect not yet discussed
should now be mentioned: the fact that, although it was generally expected that the 660-foot setback requirement would be sufficient to
achieve the purposes of title I, congressional expectations have been
frustrated by the erection of giant billboards just beyond that setback.
As the Senate Committee on Public Works reported last £all, "Clearly
readable from the highways, these signs are visible for a longer period
of time and dominate landscape to a greater degree than do signs of
conventional size located closer to the highways." 349 In view of this
fact, it would certainly be highly desirable for Congress at its current
session to adopt the amendment to title I proposed in the abortive
Federal Highway Act of 1972 changing the definition of "effective
control ... of outdoor advertising" in subsection (b) to cover all
billboards visible from the main traveled way and erected with the
purpose of being read from the highway.850
Congress should also adopt a second proposed amendment, which
345. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 15.
846. Total funding for the fiscal years 1971-73 is 97.5 million dollars. Although the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat. 250, provides no new
funds, there are about 35 million dollars in prior authorizations that can be carried
over. Of the 61 million dollars that has been allocated to the states, about 56 million
dollars has been committed to projects. Telephone conversation with George Mcinturff, Chief, Scenic Enhancement Division, Federal Highway Administration, Aug. 29,
1973.
347. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-5.2, supra note 41, 1J IO(c).
348. See text accompanying notes 17-114 supra.
349. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 14. This statement and the Committee's
recommendation that title I be amended to control signs visible from the main traveled
way of the interstate and federal-aid primary systems were based on the interim report
of the Commission on Highway Beautification, supra note 322, at 3.
350. It would seem that the word "visible" supplies a sufficiently definite standard.
But see Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Commn., 162 Ohio St. 86, 120 N.E.2d 719 (1954).
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provides for seventy-five per cent federal participation in paying compensation for the removal of nonconforming signs lawfully erected
after October 22, 1965, and prior to January l, 1968, thus rendering
it unnecessary for the states to pay the entire cost of removing such
signs.351 This latter problem is a result of the fact that the just compensation directive of subsection (g) of title I does not apply to such
signs. Apparently the omission was intentional, since the lack of any
federal participation in the payment of compensation for removal of
signs erected in that period might be expected to induce the states to
move rapidly to enact legislation implementing title I, thereby reducing the period in which signs could be lawfully erected. However,
many states did not enact implementing legislation for several years,
and although highway advertising companies and other highway advertisers were put on notice by subsection (g) that there would be no
federal funds to pay compensation for new signs erected along the interstate and primary highways between October 22, 1965, and January 1, 1968, many signs were erected during that period. It will be
very hard for any state to deny compensation to sign owners and landowners if and when these lawfully erected nonconforming signs are
removed,352 particularly since the Act requires each state to pay compensation upon the removal of any sign lawfully erected on or after
January I, 1968, even though no state advertising control statute was
in force when the sign was erected.353 If a state refuses compensation
for signs erected between October 22, 1965, and January I, 1968, and
pays compensation for signs erected on or after the latter date, the
equal protection problem will certainly be substantial.854 Such a
distinction is quite illogical. And it is grossly unfair to deny federal participation in the payment of compensation for the removal
of signs erected between October 22, 1965, and the date when a particular state enacted an advertising control statute-especially where
the state legislature did not meet until 1967 and hence had no opportunity to adopt an advertising control statute making certain signs
unlawful until more than a year after the enactment of title 1.855
351. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 130, at 14-15.
352. Many state compliance laws do, in fact, provide for payment of compensation
upon removal of any nonconforming sign lawfully in existence at the date of enactment
of the statute. See text accompanying note 178 supra.
353. This is required under subsection (g) if the state is to comply with title I and
avoid the ten per cent penalty provided by subsection (b).
354. See text accompanying notes 265-66 supra.
355. See text accompanying note 331 supra, dealing with the proposed 1972 amend-
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Subsection (c) of title I should be amended to subject onpremises advertising· signs within areas adjacent to the interstate
and federal-aid primary systems to reasonable size, lighting, and spacing standards. Sin:ce subsection (c) contains no such standards and
does not authorize the Secretary to promulgate such standards, it
would appear that on-premises signs are not now subject to any such
controls unless state or local governments on their own initative impose them. The federal standards for spacing of on-premises advertising signs, originally promulgated to implement the bonus provisions
of the 1958 Federal-Aid Highway Act, do not seem to apply to the onpremises advertising signs permitted by title I of the Highway Beautification Act. Yet, it would seem essential with respect to the preservation of natural beauty and scenic amenity that on-premises signs
be subject to reasonable standards.356 Perhaps these should be left
for development through negotiated agreements between the states
and the Secretary of Transportation, but unhappy experience
with the negotiating process suggests the desirability of promulgating
federal standards, as in the case of directional and other official signs.
Subsection (g) should be amended to make it clear whether
the owner of land on which a nonconforming sign is located is to be
compensated for the taking of his advertising rights in perpetuity, or
only for the taking of his rights under an existing advertising lease.857
The latter alternative would seem to be preferable, since the states
can use their police power to prohibit the making of any new advertising leases after expiration of existing leases. And, finally, the relationship of the recently enacted Uniform Relocation Assistance and
Real Property Acquisition Act of 1970358 to the compensation requirements of subsection (g) should be clarified.
If the suggested changes are made in title I of the Highway Beaument of the first sentence of subsection (g) of title I to provide simply that "[j]ust compensation shall be paid upon the removal of any outdoor advertising sign ••• lawfully
erected under State law." In addition to the objections to the present language of subsection (g) pointed out in the text, the report on S. 3939 points out that "[a]nother
problem has arisen because of a misunderstanding over the meaning of the term 'lawfully erected' for signs erected after January I, 1968." 1972 SENATE REI'oRT, supra note
130, at 14.
356. The Commission on Highway Beautification in its interim report, supra note
322, at 8, says: "From testimony at the Commission's hearings, it appears that in some
jurisdictions there is a need for improved control over location, design, construction and
maintenance of on-premise signs."
357. See text accompanying notes 111-14 supra.
358. Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1601-55 (1970)).
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tification Act, it would seem that the final elimination of the billboard blight that has for so long afflicted American highways may at
last be in sight. The estimated cost of 250 to 300 million dollars
would be a modest price to pay to achieve that elusive goal.

